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Introduction 
when two individuals exchange resources with, one anoth­
er, what factors determine whether the exchange is fair or 
unfair, equitable or inequitable? A number of accounts have 
been offered for the determinants of fairness or equity in 
social exchanges (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & 
Williams, 1949; Romans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Adams, 1963, 1955). 
According to'Adams (1965)-? during the process of socializa-
« * 
tion, an individual develops a set of normative expectations 
concerning what represent "fair" relationships between one's 
costs or inputs, and one's rewards or outcomes. Generally 
stated, the norm of fairness (or equity) requires that in all 
spheres of public concern, individuals should be treated 
equally, except to the extent that differential treatment is 
based on abilities, inputs, or achievements which are 
functionally related to the requirements of the task or situ­
ation (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969). 
There are two major weaknesses of theories and research 
dealing with equity. The first is that they deal primarily 
with the individual as a reactor to inequity, rather than as 
a creator of inequity. Inequity is typically induced either 
by an employer, an experimenter (Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; 
Lawler, 1968; Pritchard, Dunnette, B Jorgenson, 1972), or by 
an imaginary coworker (Leventhal, Allen, & Kemelgor, 1969; 
Leventhal, Weiss, 5 Long, 1969). Presumably, if an individu-
al's primary concern in the exchange was to establish or 
maintain equity, then inequity should occur only 
infrequently. " However, numerous empirical findings (Harding, 
et al., 1969; Tajfel, 1970; Weick & Nesset, 1968) have indi­
cated that inequitable situations do, in fact, occur rather 
frequently in interpersonal and intergroup settings. 
A second limitation of equity research is that it has 
dealt largely with mediated exchanges (Kahn, 1972), in which 
direct personal contact between members of the exchange is 
either absent or minimal. Lane and Messe (1971) suggest this 
is a rather unusual circumstance, much more common in 
industrial and experimental settings than in the more mundane 
naturalistic environment in.which most social encounters 
occur. Since face-to-face interpersonal contact is often an 
integral component of exchanges, and sine# situational 
rewards and costs are often vague or irrelevant when individ­
uals exchange directly, equity theory as stated may be of 
restricted utility in predicting exchange behavior in more 
naturalistic settings. 
In the typical study supportive of equity theory, 
inequity is forced upon the isolated subject by a third 
party, and he is given a number of alternative modes of 
reducing the inequity. However, although Adams (1965) 
cxêâLxy uùât. (gy lil u j pZ caxC c xOûS SiiOUiu OVST & 
wide range of social situations other than just those in 
which inequity has already been introduced, relatively little 
research has focused on the question of why inequity is 
< 'v . 
sometimes induced in the first place. In other words, faced 
with a situation in which inequity, if generated, is solely a 
product of one's own responses, what factors determine wheth­
er a person will behave so as to induce equity or inequity 
with respect to another person or group? 
The present study focused on the factors which influence 
the occurrence of equitable and inequitable reward alloca­
tions in a direct exchange relationship, assessing the 
effects of reward expectation, relative individual input, and 
group outcome on the allocation of a reward earned jointly by 
competing groups. The sttfdy also addressed the problem of 
specifying the appropriate comparison "other" in an exchange 
relationship, and the effects of different reference persons 
or groups on perceptions of equity. 
Equity Theory 
The determination of equity (Adams, 1965) can be 
conceived as two largely distinct, though not independent 
processes; the first primarily intrapersonal and economic, 
in which the person performs a subjective reward-cost analy­
sis of the exchange (Thibaut 0 Kelley, 1959); and the second, 
largely interpersonal and comparative, in which the person 
weighs the relative appropriateness of his reward-cost ratio 
against some standard or some normative expectation (Adams, 
u  
according to equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965), the in­
dividual (Person) weighs his inputs or investments to the ex­
change, and compares these to the outcomes or rewards he re­
ceives in return for his contributions. Inputs are defined 
as all factors perceived by Person to be relevant for earning 
dividends in a particular situation, such as effort, status, 
age, education, skill, and training. Outcomes, on the other 
hand, are defined as those factors the individual perceives 
as returns to himself as a result of his inputs. These 
include money, verbal praise, social acceptance, higher 
status, and fringe benefits. Thus far, the analysis of 
equity is largely intrapersonal and hedonistic: the individ­
ual should be most satisfied with those circumstances which 
minimize inputs and maximize outcomes (Thibaut S Kelley, 
• 1959; Homans, 1961), or which would produce the largest 
outcome/input ratio (Adams, 1965). 
A second crucial process involved in the determination 
of equity is comparative, and presumably, though not neces­
sarily, interpersonal. Person is proposed to determine his 
perceived ratio of outcomes to inputs and then the perceived 
ratio of another person or group (Other). Person then com­
pares these two outcome/input ratios, and to the extent the 
rciiioii <n.e e^udl, the êxchduye ia vieweù «la equitable. Thus, 
inequity for Person is a direct function of the perceived 
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discrepancy between these two values. Further, inequity is 
hypothesized to be an unpleasant state, the greater the 
degree of inequity, the greater the motivation to restore 
equity. 
Research by Adams and his coworkers (Adams & Rosenbaum, 
1962; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964) and others (Friedman 5 Goodman, 
1967; Lawler, 1968) supports the contention that when faced 
with either profitable (overpay) or unprofitable (underpay) 
inequity, subjects readjust i^heir inputs, outcomes, and/or 
cognitions in the direction predicted by equity theory, such 
that the outcome/input ratios between Person and other are 
equal. 
However, recent research on equity has produced numerous 
data which conflict with the predictions of the theory, which 
might in fact be better explained by alternative conceptions 
of fairness; for instance, an own equity or selfishness norm 
(Pritchard, 1969; Weick & Nesset, 1968), an equality norm 
(Sampson, 1971; Kahn, 1972), or an altruistic norm (Morgan 5 
Sawyer, 1967). 
Much of the dissenting evidence for equity theory has 
been produced using other research paradigms than the 
industrial prototype (Adams & Rosenbaum, 196 2). As a result 
of these discrepant findings, a recent trend in equity theory 
research has been attempting to determine the limiting condi­
tions for the applicability of the theory as proposed by 
6 
Adams (1965). It appears that although equity considerations 
usually exert some effect on the fairness or unfairness of 
interpersonal or intergroup exchanges, other factors moderate 
behavior within the exchange context, such that one's actual 
behavior is often a compromise between equity and other 
motives elicited by the dominant features of the situation, 
such as subjective expectation of rewards and costs, the 
social structure and salience of the exchange, salience of 
inputs toward task success, or the locus of the comparison 
other (Kahn, 1972; Leventhal S Michaels, 1969; Tajfel, 1970). 
These various environmental factors may give rise to differ­
ential salience of personal rewards and costs, and to differ­
ential expectations concerning appropriate forms of interper­
sonal behavior, which may in turn result in violations of 
equity theory predictions. Thus, not only whether one 
induces injustice into an exchange, but also whether one 
conceives a situation as equitable, may vary as a function of 
interpersonal and intergroup context, with relatively little 
regard for comparative reward-cost considerations. 
The Reward Allocation Paradigm 
Unlike ^ he industrial prototype in which the individual 
is faced with resolving inequity imposed by a third party, in 
the reward allocation paradigm, the subject becomes a 
participant observer who determines the allocation of avail­
able rewards in a direct exchange between himself and his 
7 
task partner. The subject in this situation typically has 
little information about his partner except of his perform­
ance on the joint task. The coworker has no power to deter­
mine, in any way, the allocation of the reward. 
Lane and Hesse (1972), for example, varied both the 
subject's inputs and the total reward available for alloca­
tion. Inputs were manipulated by length of time and number 
of questions on an industrial survey, and subjects were 
paired with others with equal inputs. Compared to the suffi­
cient reward condition, in which subjects allocated the 
rewards equally, in the insufficient and oversufficient con­
ditions the subjects allocated proportionally more money to 
themselves. These results were interpreted as supporting 
Weick's (1966) hypothesis of an internal standard of-equity, 
instead of Adam's formulation or Lane and Messe's own reward 
threshhold hypothesis (1971). 
Kahn (1972) and others (Morgan & Sawyer, 1967), on the 
other hand, employing variations of the reward allocation 
paradigm, have demonstrated that equality, in which individu­
al contributions are ignored and the differences in rewards 
to the two persons is minimized, may take precedence over 
equity under certain conditions. 
Sawyer (1966) identifies three general types of distri­
bution responses based on interpersonal orientations which 
are pertinent to the reward allocation, compared with equity 
8 
theory, which would propose only one. Jointly earned rewards 
may be allocated on the basis of self-interest: the person 
maximizes the amount of reward taken for himself, altruism: 
the person maximizes the amount of reward allocated to the 
other person, and role symmetry: the person takes into ac­
count contributions of both parties in allocating the reward. 
It is unclear on the basis of current research under 
what conditions these various distribution responses, 
equitable or inequitable, will occur. In the following sec­
tion, the possibility is examined that whether rewards are 
allocated selfishly, generously, equally, or equitably, may 
depend crucially on the individual's locus or standard of 
social comparison. 
will the Real Comparison Other Please Stand np? 
In his major exposition of equity theory, Adams (1965) 
states that one's expectations concerning fairness are "based 
by observation of the correlations obtaining for a reference 
person or group - a coworker or a colleague, a relative or 
neighbor, a group of coworkers, a craft group, an industry­
wide pattern" (p. 279). Though Adams acknowledges the theo­
retical and practical significance of specifying the appro­
priate reference group or person, he simply asserts that com­
parison "others" are usually "comparable to the comparer on 
one or more attributes." The reader is referred to social 
comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), reference group theory 
(Herton, 1957), relative deprivation theory (Stouffer, et 
al., 1949), and exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) for 
accounts of how the locus of social comparison is determined. 
Thus, the reference point or reference person for social 
comparison -and the determination of equity is, at best, am­
biguous, diffuse, and subject to experimenter error (Hinton, 
1972) . assuming that a situation is. perceived as fair or 
unfair with regards to one's comparison standard, it is 
crucial for equity theory to specify the determinants of the 
locus of the comparison other, since one basic method of 
avoiding inequity would be to misperceive the comparison 
standard. 
Though this problem has certainly not gone unnoticed 
' c? 
(See Pritchard, 1969; Weick, 1966; Andrews & Valenzi, 1970; 
Hinton, 1972), empirical attempts to overcome these limita­
tions have been meager. Recent attempts to clarify the 
nature of the comparison other in exchange relationships have 
been promising but inconclusive (Weick, 1966; Latane, 1966; 
Friend & Gilbert, 1973; Samuel, 1973; Lane & Hesse, 1971; 
Pettigrew, 1967; Thibaut S Kelley, 1959; Ewens S Ehrlich, 
1972) . 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) suggest for instance that the 
source of social influence, whether normative or 
informational, could affect social comparison. Weick (1966) 
includes these two factors, as well as perceived similarity 
10 
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on task relevant attributes, visibility of potential compari­
son targets, and also, perceived similarity on the basis of 
more enduring and more central personal dimensions not di­
rectly relevant to the reward/cost elements of the immediate 
situation. Evens and Ehrlich (1972) stress the social sig­
nificance of specific task or membership groups, and 
generalized social norms as sources of legitimization for 
one's behavior in exchange relationships. 
In most naturalistic settings, and particularly in 
industrial settings where equity theory has been applied, 
membership in various labor and task groups certainly 
supplies the individual with potent anchors concerning attri­
butes which are salient to particular situations where 
fairness of exchange may be an issue (Ewens & Ehrlich, 1972;* 
Pettigrew, 1967; Hinton, 1972). Thus, it might be expected 
that in situations in which group membership was made, partic­
ularly salient to the individual, that normative expectations 
deriving from group membership can mediate the individual's 
perceptions of what constitutes fairness with regards to mem­
bership and nonmembership groups, as well as whether intra-
and intergroup reward allocations are equitable. 
To summarize, in the determination of equity, the indi­
vidual first estimates the ratio of his outcomes to inputs in 
the exchange, and then he compares his outcome/input ratio to 
that of some comparison standard, since unless he has 
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clearcut conceptions of appropriate rewards and cost for the 
particular situation, he finds himself in an ambiguous situa­
tion which requires social comparison. To the extent he is 
uncertain, the individual seeks standards of comparison from 
other individuals or groups. Thus, there are three primary 
sources of cougar is on possible: comparison with one's own 
internal standards of equity, comparison with other individu­
als in an exchange, and comparison with standards derived 
from one's membership groups. How a person allocates a 
jointly earned reward should be influenced to a large extent 
not only by his rewards and costs, but also by his social 
comparison standards or expectations. 
The Effects of Group Membership 
One very potent source of normative expectation and 
social comparison undoubtedly derives from the impact of 
group membership, A very stable finding of numerous empiri­
cal studies of intergroup behavior is that membership in a 
grqup, per se, significantly influences member orientations 
toward both the ingroup (group to which one belongs) and the 
outgroup (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Blake 
S Mouton, 1951; Bass & Dunteman, 1963). Ingroups, ingroup 
members, and the products of ingroup interaction are 
typically evaluated much more favorably than are outgroups, 
outgroup members, and outgroup products. Individuals who are 
group members often are altruistic toward, and glorify their 
12 
own group, whereas they exploit and derogate the outgroap 
{Sherif, et al., 1961). Much recent research has focused on 
the question of determining the necessary and sufficient, con­
ditions for the elicitation of such a differential ingroup-
outgroup bias, and the issue is still a topic of debate 
(Dion, 1973b); however several studies suggest this 
differentiation between ingroup and outgroup occurs under 
very minimal conditions of intergroup interaction (Babbie B 
Wilkens, 1971; Kahn 6 Eyen, 1972). In fact, Kahn and Ryen 
(1972) assert that such an intergroup bias may be elicited 
merely through classification (assignment to only one of two 
interacting groups), and that this differentiation between 
groups may represent the first step in the development of 
intergroup prejudice and hostility. More relevant to the 
present study, intergroup discrimination may be defined as a 
deviation from the norm of fairness (Allport, 1954). Though 
intergroup bias has proven rather ubiquitous in both field 
and laboratory studies, the issue of how these differential 
ingroup-outgroup attitudes affect subsequent intragroup and 
intergroup behavior has been rarely addressed (Tajfel, 1970; 
Eyen 6 Kahn, in press; Dion, 1973a). 
Sherif (1958), in his theory of intergroup relations, 
stresses intergroap competition as the primary instigator of 
intergroup bias and conflict, Shetif, et al. (1951) suyyésL 
that intergroup competition establishes a reciprocally 
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frustrating situation, possibly unrelated to intragroup 
affect, which engenders norms of ingroup antipathy and 
hostility, and negative stereotypes toward an outgroup. Ac­
cording to this perspective, one group can obtain rewards 
only by depriving a rival group from attaining them, ^d thus 
group norms are adopted which facilitate altruism toward 
one's own group at the expense of rival, nonmembership 
groups. 
In similar vein, Tajfel (1969, 1970) suggests that the 
cognitive differentiation between ingroup and outgroup 
elicits a "generic norm" which prescribes that gro.up members 
cooperate with one another, and that they exploit outgroup 
members. He feels this norm develops as a consequence of our 
social construction of reality, in which we learn to catego­
rize groups as either "we" or "they." Thus, particularly in 
competitive situations, outgroup discrimination is the 
typical consequence, even though there may be no justifica­
tion for it in terms of the individual's own interests, and 
even in the absence of any previously existing attitudes of 
hostility for the outgroup. 
Tajfel (197 0) supported these contentions with experi­
mental data. He separated previously acquainted 14 and 15 
year old male subjects into groups, randomly, ostensibly on 
the basis of their visual judgments of dot patterns, and then 
required them to complete a series of matrices in which they 
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were to assign monetary rewards or penalties to members of 
both their own group and to members of outgroups. He found 
when subjects had a choice between maximization of joint 
profits, and maximization of the difference between group 
profits, subjects preferred ^ hoices which gave more money to 
the ingroup than to the outgroup, thus sacrificing the 
utilitarian advantages of the joint maximization strategy. 
Further, Wilson, Chun, and Kayatani (1965) found that by 
merely identifying two dyads as ingroup and outgroup, respec­
tively, was sufficient to promote primarily cooperative be­
havior toward the ingroup, and primarily exploitive behavior 
toward the outgroup. 
The present study examined the differential treatment of 
ingroup and outgroup members in terms of the reward alloca­
tion paradigm (Leventhal & Michaels, 1969). The extent to 
which reward allocations were fair (Homans, 1961; Lerner, in 
press) or equitable (Adams, 1965) was examined as a function 
of (1) group membership, and whether one was allocating to 
the ingroup or the outgroup, (2) ingroup success in a compet-
* 
itive situation, (3) one's expectation concerning amount of a 
joint reward, and (4) one's individual inputs to the ingroup 
effort as compared to the inputs of the other participants. 
15 
Experimental Hypotheses 
The Effects of Group Membership on Beward Allocation 
It was previously suggested that group membership sig­
nificantly affects member orientation toward both ingroup and 
outgroup members. Ingroup members are typically altruistic 
and cooperative with other ingroup members, whereas they tend 
to derogate and exploit outgroup members. Intergroup 
competition appears to be a more than sufficient condition 
for cognitive differentiation between the ingroup and the 
outgroup (Dion, 1973a; Tajfel, 1969). Thus, in a competitive 
intergroup setting in which group membership is made salient, 
and in which a subject is required to allocate a joint reward 
among members of both the ingroup and the outgroup, ingroup 
membership should provide subjects with normative expecta­
tions concerning appropriate reward allocations to both 
groups. Group members should allocate a more than equitable 
share of the joint reward to their ingroup, and a less than 
equitable share ^ ^the outgroup (Sherif, et al., 1961; 
Tajfel, 1970) . 
1. Subjects will allocate a greater share of the joint 
reward to their ingroup than would be predicted on the 
basis of relative group inputs. 
The Effects of Individual Inputs and Group Outcomes on Reward 
a l l  o n  A  t  i  m n  
Central to the conceptions of equity proposed by Adams 
(1965) and others (Romans, 1961; Blau, 1964) are inputs, or 
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am-ount of effort and other personal costs expended in an ex­
change. A majority of studies focusing on equity theory have 
supported the hypothesis that the greater one's inputs, the 
greater one's outcomes must be to establish or maintain 
equity (Adams & Eosenbaum, 1962; Law1er & 0'Gara, 1967; 
Leventhal & Anderson, 1970; Andrews S Valenzi, 1970). 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) propose that the high input 
individual is less dependent on the performance of his group 
for positive outcomes than the low input person. Thus, one 
might expect the high input person to allocate a joint reward 
' • 
more equally with his task partner than equity theory would 
predict to insure social harmony within the ingroup. This 
would serve to maintain the existence of the group which pro­
vides him status. Leventhal, Michaels, and Sanford (1972), 
for instance, in considering the effects of intragroup 
conflict, found that when the potential for conflict through 
reward comparison was present, subjects judged that equal 
reward allocations (especially those minimizing the differ­
ence between the best and worst performers) would reduce the 
potential for intragroup conflict. Deviations from equality, 
thus, should be avoided by higher input individuals. 
The low input individual, on the other hand, .is very de­
pendent on the ingroup exchange for good outcomes, since his 
relatively poor task performance would do little to enhance 
his self-esteem. He should be wary of inducing intragroup 
17 
conflict, and endangering the relationship by minimizing his 
partner's outcomes. Consequently, the lower input subjects 
should allocate the reward more equitably to the ingroup (on 
the basis of relative inputs), while the higher input 
subjects should allocate the reward more equally between 
themselves and their partners. 
2. The higher the input of the subject making the 
reward allocation, the more equal the ingroup reward al­
location; the lower the input, the greater the tendency 
to allocate ingroup rewards on the basis of relative 
member inputs. 
Research by Kahn and Ryen (1972; Ryen 6 Kahn, 1970, in 
press) and others (Thibaut, 1950; Kahn & Alexander, 1971) has 
examined the relationship between individual competence or 
status (which were assumed in the present study to constitute 
input variables) and intergroup attitudes. High input indi-
viduals tend to display more positive attitudes towards the 
ingroup than low input members. Similarly, Rosenbl,att (196^) 
postulated that high status individuals would display lower 
levels of outgroup derogation than low status individuals, 
and this hypothesis was supported by the findings of Kahn and 
Ryen (1972). They found that despite the fact that outgroup 
evaluations tended to remain more invariant than ingroup 
evaluations, high input members exhibited less stereotyped 
évaluations of outgroup members who varied widely in 
competence than did low input individuals. Thus, to the 
extent that low input subjects are unwilling or unable to 
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differentiate between outgroup members in terms of task per­
formance or other attributes, one would expect no 
differentiation in reward allocations to different group mem­
bers from an opposing group. Similarly, the high input 
person, due to his relative independence of the ingroup for 
profitable outcomes (Thibaut 5 Kelley, 1959) or to the accu­
mulations of "idiosyncracy credits" via his superior perform­
ance (Hollander, 1958), should be less constrained by the 
ingroup to react to outgroup members in terms of a generic 
outgroup norm (Tajfel, 1970), and thus should have greater 
latitude to allocate outgroup rewards according to member 
inputs. Thus, one would predict higher input members to al­
locate rewards more equitably between qutgroup members, and 
lower input members to allocate rewards more equally between 
outgroup members, ^ 
3. - The higher the inputs of the subject making the 
reward allocation, the greater the tendency for alloca­
tions to outgroup members to be made on the basis of 
relative member inputs; the lower the inputs, the more 
equal the outgroup reward allocations. 
The effects of individual inputs seem to be complicated 
by the fact that differential group outcomes produce differ­
ent patterns of evaluations for different levels of individu­
al inp^its. Kahn and Ryen (1972) and others (Wilson S Miller, 
1961; Sample S Botto, 1969; Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969; Dion, 
1973a) have demonstrated that winning and losing tend respec­
tively to increase and decrease the differentiation between 
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ingroup and outgroup. Kahn and Ryen (1972) found that evalu­
ations of the ingroup were higher for the low input person 
than the high input person when the ingroup was winning, but 
that the pattern was reversed when the ingroup was losing. 
To the extent that evaluations of the ingroup affect subse­
quent behavior toward ingroup members (and outgroup members), 
it should be expected that both group success and individual 
inputs will affect intergroup reward allocations, winning 
groups should allocate more money to the ingroup than the 
outgroup. In addition, individual inputs and group success 
should interact, such that the low input members allocates 
the most money to the ingroup when it is successful, and the 
a. • • 
least when unsuccessful. The higher input members should al­
locate relatively high rewards to the ingroup regardless of 
group success, since their ratings of ingroup tend to remain 
relatively stable compared to the ratings by low input mem­
bers. 
4. Members of winning groups will allocate more money 
to the ingroup than will losing groups. 
5. Individual input and group success will interact: 
the low input member will allocate the most money to the 
ingroup when it is successful in competition the,low 
input person will take the least money when the ingroup 
is unsuccessful. 
The Effects of Reward Expectation 
Empirical research from a number of authors (Weick 6 
Nesset, 1968; Lane & Hesse, 1972; Pritchard, 1969; Bobrow, 
20 
1972; Austin S Walster, in press) indicates that if one has 
concrete expectations concerning outcomes, or an internal 
standard of equity, social comparison with «a generalized 
other ®ft.y become less salient in the determination of equity. 
Seick and Nesset (1968), for example, using a role-playing 
procedure found evidence for the importance of internal stan­
dards in the perception of equity. More recently. Lane and 
Messe (1972) produced evidence that one's internal standard 
is more important than the inputs of a coworker when the 
coworker is anonymous. Bobrow (1972) an^ Flynn (1972) 
present evidence that reward expectations influence not only 
one's perceptions of fairness, but also reward distributions 
toward a coworker. Thus, to the extent a subject's expecta­
tion of reward is violated, he will feel dissatisfied with 
the relationship, and will first be concerned with fulfilling 
his reward expectations. Only after the reward expectation 
has been nearly matched or exceeded should the person be con­
cerned with attaining equity of reward allocation toward 
other ingroup or outgroup members. When subjects receive 
much less joint reward than expected, they should allocate 
proportionally more money for themselves, and when they re­
ceive much more reward than anticipated, they should allocate 
less to themselves. 
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6. When subjects receive less joint reward than expect­
ed, they will allocate proportionally more money for 
themselves; when they receive more joint reward than 
expected, they will take proportionally less. 
i 
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Hethods 
Design and Overview 
> 
The design was a 2 x 2 x 3 factorial, manipulating two 
levels of group success (Win, Lose), two levels of reward ex­
pectation (High or low, compared to the obtained reward), and 
three levels of individual inputs (High, Equal, or Low, com­
pared to the performance of a partner). 
Two dyads competed with each,other in a numerical 
matrix-game. Each individual group member made strategy , 
choices against a single member of the opposing group, with 
members of both groups alternating choices after each trial. 
g 
However, though only specific individuals from each group 
made choices on any given trial, group success was determined 
on the basis of total dyadic performance, and not on the 
basis of individual performances. By controlling the trial 
feedback to each subject, it was possible to control each in­
dividual's perceived task inputs. The game matrix was con­
structed such that on a given trial, the greater the perform­
ance of one subject, the worse the perceived performance of 
the opposing subject. 
Before engaging in the competition, subjects were told 
they could expect to earn a reward for their joint perform­
ance, which was either much more or much less than the reward 
actually received. Subséquent to completing the task, groups 
were given either winning or losing feedback, and each 
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subject was told he had been arbitrarily designated to be the 
banker, responsible for allocating the monetary reward to the 
members of his own dyad and the other dyad. Relative evalaa-
/ 
tions of each of the competing dyads, perceptions of similar­
ity of each of the other participants to the subject along 
four trait dimensions, as well as individual reactions to the 
independent variables and the experimental procedure in gen­
eral were also assessed. 
Subjects 
The subjects were 146 male introductory psychology stur 
dents who participated in return for both course credit and 
an unspecified monetary reward. Subjects were run in dyadic 
groups, and all subjects within an experimental session were 
unacquainted with one another. The data from two subjects 
who failed to follow instructions were not inclu&edf 
Procedure 
As subjects arrived at the experimental waiting room, 
they were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
rooms, and told they would be members of the group occupying 
that experimental room. Interaction between any two subjects 
was limited to brief visual encounters, and subjects were 
specifically instructed not to talk to one another during the 
experiment "for purposes of experimental control." They were 
told, however, that they would be given the opportunity to 
interact with their partners for a few minutes at the end of 
2H 
the formal experiment. Two subjects were assigned to each of 
the experimental rooms, and were told that for purposes of 
the present experiment, they would be working.together as a -
group against the two-person group in the other experimental 
room. The two subjects within a room were prevented visu^ 
contact with one another by a large opaque screen placed be­
tween their seating positions, thus group membership was not 
confounded to any great extent with degree of contact between = 
. - , 
individuals. 
After all four subjects arrived and had been assigned to 
an experimental room, a tape recording containing instruc­
tions concerning the nature of the task (see Appendix A), and 
the procedure to be followed in performing the task (see Ap­
pendix B) was played. Subjects were also informed they would 
be paid for their performance (see Appendix A). 
Upon completion of the taped instructions (which lasted 
approximately seven minutes), reward expectation was manipu-
lated by telling subjects they could expect to earn either 
$3.00 or $12.00 for their joint performance. 
Subjects were then asked if they had any further ques­
tions, and were instructed to begin working on the task when 
the appropriate cue light was activated. Subjects proceeded 
to work on the task for a total of twenty minutes. Though 
subjects believed they were actually engaging a member of the 
other group in the competition, both groups were given false 
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feedback concerning trial outcomes, independent of the strat­
egy choices they might have been employing. In this manner 
it was possible to control individual inputs to the group 
effort. Individual inputs were manipulated by controlling 
'trial feedback to individual subjects, independent of their 
actual performances, such that three levels of task inputs, 
high, equal, or low, were obtained. After twenty minutes, 
subjects were instructed to stop working on the task. At 
this time, one group at random was informed it had won the 
competition, and the other that it had lost the competition. 
Subjects were then informed they had earned a total of 
six dollars and three cents ($6.03), and that since it was 
still necessary to disallow verbal interaction between 
participants, one individual at random would be chosen as the 
banker. Subjects were told the banker's responsibility would 
be to divide the joint reward among all four participants; 
himself, his partner, his opponent, and his partner's 
opponent. They were instructed the banker was solely respon­
sible for dividing the joint reward, and that his decisions 
would be final, A reward allocation form (see Appendix C) 
was to be arbitrarily given to one of the four participants, 
along with a number of other experimental questionnaires • 
received by all subjects. Thus, they believed that only one 
subject would allocate the joint reward. The reward alloca­
tion form was to be completed, indicating the amount of money 
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the subject wished to give each participant, sealed in an 
envelope, and returned to the experimenter after all subjects 
had completed the other experimental forms (See Appendix D). 
The experimenter, they were told, would then complete 
"bearer's notes" from the information contained on the reward 
allocation sheet, and would deliver these to the subjects at 
the completion of the experiment. These bearer's notes could 
be exchanged for the amount of cash indicated by taking them 
to the Psychology Main Office. Th^ procedure was necessary, 
it was explained, because department^policy did not allow the 
direct exchange of cash money between the experimenter and 
the subject, for both legal and security reasons. 
Each subject was then given, individually, the reward 
•i? 
allocation sheet and an envelope, along with the other exper­
imental materials, and was requested to complete all the ex­
perimental materials as appropriate. Subjects dividing the 
reward were thus able to maintain relative anonymity concern­
ing reward allocations they made, since they were not re­
quired to identify themselves personally, either on the allo­
cation form, or subsequent to completing the experiment. 
In addition to the reward allocation form, subjects were 
given the own group bias questionnaire (Ryen & Kahn, 1970), 
.the perceived similarity measures (all in counterbalanced 
order), and finally, a number of specific items designed to 
assess the effectiveness of the independent variables and to 
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assess the perceptions of the purpose of the experiment in 
general. 
Following completion of the dependent measures, all the 
experimental materials were collected, and subjects were all 
assembled together in one of the experimental rooms. After 
questioning the subjects concerning their suspiciousness of 
the experimenter's intentions and the purposes of the various 
» 
manipulations, they were fully debriefed, given experimental 
credit for their participation along with instructions for 
obtaining one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) in cash per 
subject, and were dismissed. 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
The independent variables were reward expectation, indi­
viduals inputs, and group outcome. 
Reward expectation. In the high expectation condition, 
subjects were told that on the basis of previous research, 
though the amount of money earned in the experiment had var­
ied widely, that the average amount earned by the four 
participants in a given experimental session, was approxi­
mately twelve dollars ($12.00) . In the low expectation con­
dition, subjects were led to believe they would probably earn 
three dollars ($3.00) among the four participants. In 
actuality, all groups received approximately six dollars 
($6.03), respectively either half as much, or twice as much 
as the high and low expectation subjects anticipated. 
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Individaal inputs. One player within a dyad was arbi­
trarily designated the high input member, and his partner, 
the low input member, or else both players on a side were 
designated equal (moderate) input players. Trial feedback to 
these individuals was identical within an input condition 
across individuals, and was predetermined as described subse­
quently. The high input subjects were given trial feedback 
stating they scored on the average, three points for their 
group (the opposing group member would ostensibly have 
received on the average, one point per trial); the equal 
input subjects, two points per trial (compared to two points 
for the opposing group member); and the low input subjects, 
one point per trial (versus three points for the opposing 
group member). Thus, across trials, the high input subjects 
would have contributed seventy-five percent of their group's 
total points, the equal input subjects, fifty percent, and 
the low input subjects, twenty-five percent. Points for a 
particular trial were assigned in a semi-random fashion, such 
that each subject would score his designated average sixty 
percent of the trials, and either above or below his average 
on the remaining forty percent of the trials, thus 
maintaining the average over the entire sequence. 
Group outcome. Group outcome of the dyads was manipu­
lated by arbitrarily telling one of the dyads they had scored 
more points than the opposition, and had thus won the 
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competition, or that they had been outscored, and had thus 
lost. Winning dyads were told they had accumulated one-
hundred and seventy (170) total points (versus 160 actual 
points), and the losing dyads, one-hundred and fifty (150) 
points. During the twenty minute task, a total of three-
hundred and twenty (320) actual points had been accumulated, 
by both groups, one-hundred and sixty (160) points by each 
dyad. High input subjects had scored one-hundred and twenty 
(120) points, equal input subjects, eighty (80) points, and 
low input members, forty (40) points, 
Reward allocation. The central dependent variable was 
the reward allocation subjects made to the different 
participants. The three primary indices of reward allocation 
were (1) amount of money from the total reward allocated to 
the ingroup, (2) percentage of the ingroup reward taken for 
self, and (3) percentage of outgroup reward allocated to the 
partner's opponent (whose performance was identical to that 
of the subject himself). 
Own group bias. The own group bias measure (Ryen & 
Kahn, 1970), a measure of relative evaluation of the ingroup 
to the outgroup, consisted of six bi-polar adjective pairs 
rated along eight-point scales; sensible-foolish, sloppy-
orderly, practical-impractical, good-bad, close-distant, and 
flexible-rigid (see Appendix D). To obtain the score for a 
group, scores were summed across individual items to produce 
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a scale range of six to forty-eight points. Own group bias 
scores were obtained by calculating the difference between 
ingroup scores and outgroup scores, the more positive the 
score, the more positive the evaluation of the ingroup com­
pared to the outgroup. 
Other dependent measures. The perceived similarity 
measures were derived by having the subject rate each experi­
mental participant along twelve bipolar adjective scales 
comprising four trait dimensions, motive, sociometric, per­
sonality, and ability (Wilson, Chun, & Kayatani, 1965). 
There were three semantic differential scales for each of the 
four trait dimensions: motive - trustworthy-devious, 
cooperative-competitive, and fair-unfair; sociometric -
friendly-unfriendly, likable-dislikable, and pleasant-
unpleasant; personality - responsible-irresponsible,,indepen­
dent-dependent, and stable-unstable and ability - effective-
ineffective, capable-incapable, and skillful-lucky (see Ap­
pendix D). Each bipolar adjective pair was rated along a 
seven-point scale, the higher the rating, the more positive 
the evaluation of that participant on the scale. Self-
evaluations were then compared to the ratings of the other 
three participants to determine how similar each was attri­
buted to be to the subject along the four trait dimensions. 
Half the items were rated using the negative anchor of the 
bipolar trait, and half using the positive anchor. Subjects 
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rated the other three participants in counterbalanced order. 
In addition, order of presentation of items was randomized 
across participant evaluated. 
Subjects also completed a manipulation check question­
naire designed to measure perceived reward expectancy com­
pared to actual reward, absolute and relative perceptions of 
individual trial inputs both for self, and for the other 
participants, and perceived group success, other measures 
included items assessing perceived fairness of the reward al­
location, and a measure of relative liking for the other 
participants (see Appendix D). 
Task 
The task was performed by a member from each dyad making 
one of five possible competitive strategy choices, which was 
matched by a similar choice made simultaneously by one member 
of the second dyad. All combinations of these five possible 
choices per subject yielded a five-by-five matrix, or twenty-
five possible choice combinations (see Appendix B). Associ­
ated with each choice combination were zero-sum trial 
outcomes. Subjects making choices on a given trial could re­
ceive different outcomes, the greater the payoff to one 
subject, the less the payoff to the other, and the sum of the 
joint individual payoffs equalling four points per trial. 
Members of a dyad alternated making strategy choices against 
the opposing dyad members, and the objective of the task was 
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to total as many points as possible for the ingroup, while 
yielding as few points as possible to the opposition. By 
consulting the payoff matrix, with knowledge of one's own 
strategy choice and of the trial payoff, it was possible for 
the subject to learn the choice of his opponent. Ostensibly, 
by observing the regularities and patterns of his opponent's 
choices, it was possible for the subject to anticipate the 
strategy choices of his opponent, and thus, to choose an al­
ternative which would maximize the subject's trial outcomes. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a series of lights and 
switches, one panel in each of the two experimental rooms, 
which could be used to make strategy choices. Each switch 
activated a light on the subject's panel, as well as a corre­
sponding light on the experimenter's control panel. A second 
bank of lights above the choice lights was used to relay 
trial outcomes to the subjects. These lights were activated 
by switches on the control panel, thus enabling the experi­
menter to control trial feedback to the subjects. Two lights 
on the right side of the subjects' panels which could be 
activated one at a time by the experimenter, were used to in­
dicate the order of alternation of subjects in making strate­
gy choices. 
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The experimenter could communicate verbal messages to 
the subjects by way of a microphone-tape recorder unit locat­
ed in the control room, with speakers extending to both ex­
perimental rooms. 
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Results 
Effectiveness of the experimental manipulations 
Reward expectation. An RNOVA of the reward expectation 
data yielded a highly significant effect for reward expecta­
tion, F(1,132)=173,33, 2<.001. Three dollar expectation 
subjects reported having expected earning on the average, 
$4.25, and twelve dollar expectation subjects, $9.10 among 
the four participants for their joint experimental perform­
ance. In addition, a significant expectation by group 
outcome interaction was obtained, F(1,132)=9.34, £<.01, with 
winning group members reporting they expected significantly 
more money than losers in the $12 condition (£<.05, Newoan-
Keuls), and significantly less than losers in the $3 condi­
tion (£<.05, Newman-Keuls), These findings are undoubtedly 
biased by the consideration that the reward expectation 
ratings were made after subjects were informed of their 
actual earnings; however, it is apparent that subjects 
actually did have significantly different reward expectations 
in the intended directions across the different expectation 
conditions. 
Group outcome. Also on the post-experimental question­
naire (see Appendix D) subjects rated both the ingroup and 
outgroup on perceived group success on the task, using 
7-point scales (the higher the rating, the higher the 
perceived success). An ANOVA of ingroup ratings revealed a 
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significant effect for group outcome, F(1,132)=43.82, £<.001. 
Losers rated ingroup success on the average, 4.15, and 
winners, 5.47. Further effects on this measure were found 
for individual inputs, F{2,132)=3.95, £<.05; with low input 
subjects perceiving the ingroup to be less successful than 
either equal or high input subjects, which did not differ 
from one another (£>.05, Newnan-Keuls). Also, an expectation 
by inputs interaction was obtained, F(2,132)=4.50, £<.025; 
with high input subjects in the $12 condition rating the 
ingroup more successful than equal and low input subjects, 
but in the $3 condition, rating ingroup success significantly 
lower than in either of the other input conditions (£s<.05, 
Newman-Keuls). 
Similar trends are suggested by the second measure, 
perceived outgroup success, except they are in the opposite 
direction from the ingroup ratings. A main effect for group 
outcome was obtained, F(1,132)=118.08, £<.001. losing group 
members rated other group success as higher (5,53) than did 
winning groups (3.61). This measure also yielded a signifi­
cant expectation by group outcome interaction, F(1,132)=4.19, 
£<.05. Losers rated the outgroup as less successful in the 
$3 condition than in the $12 condition, but winners rated the 
outgroup as more successful in the $3 condition (£s<.05, 
Newman-Keuls). NO other effects reached significance. 
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Overall, it appears that the group outcome manipulation 
vas successful in affecting subject perceptions of relative 
group success. In addition, reward expectation and individu­
al inputs also seem to have exerted effects on perceived 
group success. 
Individual inputs. Subjects were also requested to es­
timate the percent of total task points scored by each of the 
experimental participants, in order to assess the effective­
ness of the individual input manipulations. An AN07A of 
self-estimates yielded a highly significant effect for indi­
vidual inputs, F(2,132)=59.16, 2<.001. Low input members es­
timated they had scored 20.81% of the total points (versus 
12.5% actual), equal input members, 26.17% (versus 25.0% 
actual), and high input members, 29.85% (versus 37.5% 
actual). These differences were significantly different from 
one another {£S<.05, Newman-Keuls), despite the fact that low 
input subjects tended to overestimate, and high input 
subjects to underestimate their actual performances.* This 
analysis also yielded a significant effect for group outcome, 
F (1,132)=63.63, £<.001, with members of losing groups rating 
themselves as scoring a smaller percent of total points than 
winning group members. Further, individuals who expected to 
lyery similar distortion patterns for individual per­
formance were also noted by Kahn and Ryen (1972). 
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earn $3 among all participants believed they had performed 
less well (24.61%) than those in the $12 condition (26.61%). 
The effect was significant, F(1,132)=8.59, £<.005. None of 
the interactions yielded significant effects. 
Similar analyses were undertaken on estimated percent 
scoring by each of the other participants, and although these 
analyses were not independent of one another (since the total 
for all four participants necessarily totals to 100%), the 
general trends obtained were identical to those for ratings 
of self. For percent of points scored by partner, the indi­
vidual input effect yielded an F-ratio of 34.57 (df=2,132, 
£<.001), for opponent's scoring, 10.65 (£<.001) , and for 
partner's opponent, 1.68 (£<.25). In all cases, subjects who 
had in fact been more successful individually, were rated to 
have scored more total points than their counterparts, who 
had actually scored fewer points. These findings are much in 
line with the intended direction of effects for the individu­
al inputs manipulations. 
Significant effects for group outcome were also obtained 
across these latter three analyses, respectively, 
r(1,132)=63.58 (£<.001), 72.76 (£<.001), and 16.27 (£<.001), 
for estimated scoring percent for partner, opponent, and 
partner's opponent. Winning group members were rated as 
scoring more points than their losing counterparts. NO other 
relevant effects reached significance. 
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Hypothesis one 
Hypothesis one stated that subjects would allocate a 
more than equitable share of the joint reward to the ingroup, 
and a less than equitable share to the outgroup. The hypoth­
esis was supported. 
We can predict on the basis of equity theory (Adams, 
1965) that individual, and by inference, group reward alloca­
tions should be made on the basis of relevant inputs. Since 
the most relevant inputs for group outcomes would thus be 
group performance, and since winning groups scored 171 total 
points and losing groups, 149 points, the equitable share for 
winning groups would be 171/320 (53.44%) of the total reward, 
and for losing groups, 149/320 (46.56%). 
Empirically, ingroup allocations for both winning and 
losing groups exceeded equity predictions significantly. 
Binning group members allocated on the average, 55.24% to the 
ingroup (+1.8%), and losing groups, 49.86% (+3.3%) (see Fig. 
1) . Averaging across group outcome, it would be predicted 
that ingroup members should allocate on the average, 50% of 
the total reward to the ingroup, and an equal portion to the 
outgroup. 
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The obtained value for average ingroup allocation was 52.46%; 
the difference between expected and observed population 
values was significant, t(132)=3.72, £<.001.i 
a second analysis was performed on the ingroup reward 
allocation data to provide additional information on 
directionality of the allocations of individuals, which could 
conceivably have little overlap with the preceding quantitive 
analysis, which averages across individuals. The number of 
subjects allocating a greater than equitable share of the 
total reward to the ingroup was tabulated across group 
outcome and individual input conditions, and a Chi-sguare 
analysis was performed (see Table 1). The expected value of 
5055 (12) of the maximum possible cell frequency was used in 
calculating the deviation scores, assuming the treatment dis­
tributions to be normal, with means equal to the values for 
equity for the treatments. The analysis yielded a signifi­
cant effect, Chi-sqnare=25.33, df=2, £<.001. Overall, 65.3% 
of all subjects allocated greater than equitable shares of 
the joint reward to the ingroup. 
lOnless otherwise indicated, all tests of significance 
are two-tailed. 
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Hypothesis two 
Hypothesis two stated that the higher the subject's 
inputs, the more equal the ingroup reward allocations, while 
the lower the inputs, the greater the tendency to allocate 
rewards on the basis of relative member inputs. The hypothe­
sis was generally supported. 
An ANOVi of percent of ingroup reward allocated to self 
was performed, yielding a significant effect for individual 
inputs, F (2,132) = 12.89, £<.001 (see Table 2). While high 
input subjects took 50.42% for themselves, and equal input 
subjects, 49.86%, the low input subjects took only 47.08% 
(see Fig. 2). The former two means did not differ from one 
another (£>.05, Newman-Keuls) nor from equality or 50% {ts= 
respectively, 1.13, .86, dfs=47. £s=n.s.), while the mean for 
low input subjects was significantly different from the other 
two means (£s<.05, Newman-Keuls), and was significantly less 
than equality (t=2.43, £<.05). It is interesting to note 
that had ingroup rewards been allocated solely on the basis 
of equity considerations, low inputs subjects would have 
allocated 25% to themselves, equal input subjects, 50%, and 
high input subjects, 75%. 
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Table 1, Contingency table for percent of subjects 
allocating greater than equitable shares of the 
total reward to the ingroup. 
Group Outcome 
Lose Win Sum Possible 
Low 19 3 22 48 
Equal 21 14 35 48 
High 20 17 37 48 
Sum 60 
Possible 72 
34 94 
72 144 
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Table 2. ANOVA summary table for percent ingroup reward 
allocated to self. 
Source of variation Degrees of Mean F values 
freedom squares 
A Reward Expectation 1 1.48 .12 
B Group Outcome 1 4.84 .41 
A X B 1 17.22 1.44 
C Individual Inputs 2 153.67 12.89= 
A X C 2 8.52 .72 
CO
 
X n
 
2 4.44 .37 
A X B X C 2 25.39 2.13 
Error 132 11.92 
Total U3 
*••*£<.001 
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Hypothesis three 
Hypothesis three stated that the higher the inputs of 
the subject allocating the joint reward, the greater the 
tendency to allocate outgroup rewards on the basis of rela­
tive member inputs (equity), while the less the inputs of the 
allocator, the more equal the outgroup reward allocations. 
This hypothesis was supported, though the magnitude of 
effects was not large. 
Low input subjects allocated less to low input outgroup 
members (49.37% of the outgroup reward), than did equal input 
subjects to their outgroup counterparts (50.20%), than did 
high input subjects to their partner's opponents (51.96%) 
(see Fig. 3). 
An ANOVA of percent outgroup reward allocated to 
partner's opponent (see Table 3) yielded a significant effect 
for individual inputs (£<-001), and these means differed sig­
nificantly from one another (£s<.05, Newman-Keuls). However, 
for low and equal input conditions, the obtained means did 
not differ from equality (ts= respectively, 1.63, ,24, 
dfs=47, £S>.05), but high input subjects allocated signifi­
cantly more money to high input members of the outgroup 
(t=2.73, e<.01). 
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Table 3. ANOVA summary table for percent outgroup reward 
to partner's opponent. 
Source of variation Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean 
squares 
F values 
A Reward Expectation 1 .99 .12 
B Group Outcome 1 16.69 2.08 
A X B 1 8.11 1.01 
C Individual Inputs 2 80 . 66 10.05**** 
A X C 2 1.32 .16 
B X C 2 6.03 .75 
A X B X C 2 6. 66 .83 
Error 132 8.02 
Total 143 
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Hypothesis four 
Hypothesis four stated that winning group members should 
allocate more money to the ingroup than losing group members. 
This hypothesis was strongly supported, àn àNOVA of ingroup 
allocations (see Table 4) yielded a significant effect for 
group outcome (£<,001) . Winning group members allocated on 
the average 55.24% of the total reward to the ingroup, and 
losing group members, 49.6836 (see Fig. 1). 
Hypothesis five 
Hypothesis five predicted that individual inputs and 
group outcome would interact, with low input subjects taking 
the least money of all for the ingroup when the ingroup was 
unsuccessful (lose), and the most money for the ingroup when 
the ingroup was successful (win). The hypothesis was not 
supported. 
although the low input subject was indeed least 
exploitive of the outgroup when his ingroup lost, he was also 
less selfish than either equal or high input subjects when 
the ingroup won. à significant interaction was, however, ob­
tained in this instance (see Table 4), due not to the pre­
dicted effects, but rather to the fact that high input 
subjects took less than equitable shares when members of 
losing groups, but took more equitable shares when on winning 
groups (£S<.05, Hewaan-Keuls). 
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Table ». ÀNOVA summary table for per cent of total 
reward allocated to ingroup across experimental 
conditions. 
Source of variation Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean 
squares 
F values 
A Reward Expectation 1 17.92  .62  
B Group Outcome 1 1114.45  38 .82*** *  
a  X B 1  28.98  1 .01  
C Individual Inputs 2 334.40  11 .65*** *  
a x e  2  13 .07  .46  
B X C 2 186.41  6 .49*** *  
a  X B X c  2 12 .68  .44  
Error 132 28 .71  
Total 
* * * *2<.001 
143 
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Hypothesis six 
Hypothesis six stated that when the subject's reward ex­
pectation was violated and he received much less joint reward 
than anticipated, he should allocate proportionally more of 
the joint reward to himself than if the joint reward was much 
more than expected. This hypothesis was not supported, al­
though the results are suggestive. 
An ANOVA of raw cash allocation to self yielded no sig­
nificant effect for reward expectation (see Table 5). 
Neither was a significant effect obtained for the effects of 
reward expectation on percent of ingroup reward allocated to 
self (see Table 2). However, both analyses yield interesting 
interactions between reward expectation and group outcome, 
neither of which reaches acceptable levels of significance. 
Rather consistently in the losing condition, $12 expectation 
subjects allocated larger rewards to themselves than $3 ex­
pectation subjects, as was predicted by the hypothesis. This 
was particularly true for low input subjects. The trend was 
reversed, however, in the winning condition, except for the 
high input subjects. The mean values for self-allocations 
differed nonsignificantly in the predicted direction, with $3 
expectation subjects taking $1.54 for themselves, and the $12 
expectation subjects, $1.57. Further, $3 expectation 
subjects allocated less money to their partners ($1.60) than 
did $12 subjects ($1.62). 
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Table 5. ANOVA summary table for raw cash reward allo­
cations to self across experimental conditions. 
Source of variation Degrees of 
freedom 
Hean 
squares 
F values 
A Reward Expectation 1 .02 .65 
B Group Outcome 1 1.12 29.96**»* 
A X B 1 .08 2.05 
C Individual Inputs 2 .81 21.48**** 
A X C 2 .03 
o
 
00 
B X C 2 .20 5.40*** 
A X B X C 2 .OU 1.04 
Error 132 .04 
Total 
***£<.01 
1*43 
****£<,001 
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additional relevant data 
Group évaluations. Separate ANOVAs were performed on 
the evaluations of the ingroup (see Table 6), the outgroup 
(see Table 7), and on own group bias - the difference between 
ingroup and outgroup scores (see Table 8). The results are 
generally in line with the findings of previous research 
(e.g., Kahn S Byen, 1972). 
The analysis of the own group bias scores produced sig­
nificant effects for group outcome (£<,001), with winning 
producing greater bias than losing; for individual inputs 
(£<.001), with own group bias increasing with increasing 
inputs; and for the group outcome by individual inputs inter­
action (£<.025), with individual inputs exerting more 
dramatic effects on own group bias in winning than in losing 
conditions (see Table 9). 
The trends suggested by the own group bias measures re­
flect strong effects for group outcome and individual inputs 
in the evaluations of the ingroup (see Table 6). The analy­
sis of outgroup evaluations reveals that outgroup ratings are 
relatively stable compared to ingroup ratings, with effects 
only of group outcome (£<.01; see Table 7). 
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Table 6. ANOVA summary table for ingroup evaluations. 
Source of variation Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean 
squares 
F values 
a Reward Expectation 1 2.01  .13  
B Group Outcome 1 327.01  21 .70*** *  
A X B 1 6.67  .44  
c  Individual Inputs 2 135.58  9 .00*** *  
A X C 2 12 .86  .85  
B X C 2 8 .53  .57  
A X B X C 2 26 .36  1 .75  
Error 132 15 .07  
Total 143 
****£<,001 
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Table 7. AN07A summary table for outgroup evaluations. 
Source of variation Degrees of Mean F values 
freedom squares 
A Reward Expectation 1 16.67 .72 
B Group Outcome 1 158. 34 6.85*** 
A X B 1 14.06 .61 
C Individual Inputs 2 4.00 .17 
A X C 2 8.53 .37 
B X C 2 34.78 1.50 
A X B X C 2 17.58 .76 
Error 132 23.12 
Total 143 
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Table 8. ANOVA summary table for own group bias scores. 
Source of variation Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean 
squares 
F values 
A Reward Expectation 1 23.36 1.30 
B Group Outcome 1 812.25 47.11**** 
A X B 1 17.36 1.04 
C Individual Inputs 2 237.44 13.56**** 
A X C 2 9.69 .53 
B X C 2 86.33 4.91** 
A X B X C 2 46. 19 2.67 
Error 132 17.34 
Total 
**£<.025 
143 
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Table 9. Mean ingroup, outgroup, and own group bias 
ratings across experimental conditions. 
$3 Expectation 
Lose Bin 
Ingroup Outgroup 0GB Ingroup Outgroup 0GB 
Low 31.17 29.83 + 1.33 33.08 30.33 + 2.75 
Equal 31.08 30.08 + 1.00 35.42 28.67 + 6.75 
High 33.83 30.58 + 3.25 35.33 27.08 + 8.25 
$12 Expectation 
Lose Win 
Ingroup Outgroup 0GB Ingroup Outgroup 0GB 
Low 30.08 31.42 - 1.33 32.25 28.17 + 1.75 
Equal 32.83 30.67 + 2.17 35.42 30.33 + 5.25 
High 32.58 32.33 + 0.25 38.17 27.75 +10.42 
Note: Means under a column heading bearing common super­
scripts do not differ from one another at th«* D=.O.S 
level using Kewman-Keuls analyses. 
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k closer analysis of the relative stability of outgroup 
ratings reveals that the ratings are stable only for low and 
equal input subjects, and not for high input subjects. The 
cell variance for the low input condition was 144.89, for the 
equal condition, 127.89, and for the high input condition, 
317.30.1 These variances were tested for homogeneity using 
Hartley's statistic, and the variance for the high input con­
dition was found to be unequal to the variance of the low 
input condition, Fmax (3,47)=2.19, p<.05, and to the variance 
of the equal input condition, Fmax=2.48, £<.05. The latter 
two variances did not differ from one another, Fmax=1.13, 
2=n.s. 
Own group bias scores were positively related to ingroup 
evaluations, r(1U2)=.61, but negatively related to 
outgroup evaluations, r=-.60, £<.0001. Further, ingroup and 
outgroup evaluations were positively correlated, r=.44, 
£<.0001. 
iThe reader should note that for the low and high input 
conditions, subjects were rating outgroups consisting of a 
high and a low input member, while in the equal input condi­
tions subjects were rating relatively equal input members. 
In addition, over all three input conditions, one half of the 
outgroups rated won, and half lost. 
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Perceived similarity. A 2X2X3X12X4X4 ANOVâ (reward 
expectation by group outcome by individual inputs by subjects 
by person evaluated by trait rated, with person evaluated and 
trait rated as nested factors) was undertaken on the 
perceived similarity data (see Table 10). Numerous effects 
were found to reach significance; however, only those data of 
interest in explicating the nature of the social comparison 
processes relevant to the determination of reward allocations 
will be closely examined (see Appendix E for the full table 
of mean ratings). 
Of primary interest is the significant effect for person 
rated (e.g., self, partner, opponent, partner's opponent), 
F (3,396)=210.01, £<.0001. Across all traits, individuals 
rated themselves 16.60 and partner, 15.73; but rated opponent 
13.11, and partner's opponent 14.12. Osing Newman-Keuls 
analyses, the ratings of the ingroup members (e.g., self and 
partner) did not differ significantly, nor did the ratings of 
outgroup members differ (£s>.05); however, ingroup member 
ratings were significantly different from outgroup member 
ratings (£s<.05). 
The significant interaction between person evaluated and 
trait rated is also of interest (£<.001; see Fig. 4). 
Ratings of ingroup members for the skill dimension were 
almost identical (as they in fact, were, based on summed 
group member inputs), but for the other three trait dimen­
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sions self was rated slightly, but nonsignificantly, higher 
than partner (£s>.05» Newaan-Keuls). Outgroup member were 
also rated almost identically on the skill dimension. 
Another finding of interest was the fact that on the 
motive dimension, opponent was rated significantly lower than 
all other participants, and significantly lower than outgroup 
member ratings on any other trait dimension (2s<.05, Newman-
Keuls). Motive ratings for partner's opponent, on the other 
hand, did not differ from motive ratings for partner (2>-05), 
and were significantly higher than opponent ratings on the 
remaining trait dimensions (£s<.05, Newman-Keuls). Ratings 
of outgroup members on the personality and sociometric dimen­
sions did not differ from each other, though, of course, they 
were significantly lower than comparable ratings for ingroup 
members (ps<.05, Newman-Keuls). 
Further, the reader will recall that partner's opponent 
was in reality, identical to self in terms of task inputs, 
and it would be expected that these individuals would be 
rated similarly in terms of the skill dimension, at least, if 
not on the other dimensions as well. This expectation was 
not upheld. On all dimensions, self was rated significantly 
higher than the outgroup counterpart {£s<.05, Newman-Keuls). 
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Table 10. ANOVA summary table for individual evaluation 
data across experimental conditions, rated 
participant, and trait evaluated. 
Source of variation Degrees of Mean F values 
freedom squares 
A Reward Expectation 1 70.14  4 .63  
B Group Outcome 1 5 .25  .34  
A X B 1 11.57  1 .77  
C Individual Inputs 2 24 .32  1 .61  
A X C 2 24 .43  1 .61  
B X C 2 60 .07  3 .97  
A X B X c  2  106.93  7 .06  
D Subjects/A X B X C 132 15 .  14  
F Participant Rated 3 1419.69  210.01  
A X F 3 18 .47  2 .73  
B X F 3 30.87  4 .57  
A X B X F 3 8 .33  1 .23  
C X F 6 76 .87  11 .37  
A X C X F 6 21.63  3 .20  
B X C X F 6 14 .75  2 .18  
A X B X C X F 6 30.67  4 .54  
F/D 396 6 .76  
G Trait Evaluated 3 22 .82  6 .87  
A X G 3 14 .66  4 .42  
B X G 3 13.99  4 .21  
A X B X G 3 1 .62  .43  
C X G 6 18 .  15  5 .47  
A X C X G 6 6 .83  2 .06  
B X C X G 6 5 .06  1 .52  
A X B X c  X G 6 7 .51  2 .26  
G/D 396 3 .32  
F X G 9 76 .40  25 .67  
A X F X G 9 12.10  4 .07  
B X F X G 9 4 .68  1 .57  
A X B X F X G 9 13 .26  4 .46  
C X F X G 18 14 .27  4 .80  
A X C X F X G 18 5 .49  1 .84  
B X C X F X G 18 7 .32  2-46  
A X B X C X F X G 18 7 .76  2 .61  
Residual 1188 2 .98  
Total 2304 
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A second significant interaction is also of interest -
between individual inputs and person evaluated (£<.001). The 
interaction is depicted in Figure 5. Although subjects 
tended to differentiate ratings across input levels for self, 
partner, and opponent, the ratings for partner's opponent 
were almost identical in all three input conditions. 
Factor analytic data for attributed similarity. The 
data for individual trait evaluations across both individuals 
and traits may be conceptualized as a multitrait-multimethod 
model (Campbell 6 Fiske, 1959). Four traits (motive, 
sociometric, personality, and skill) were measured across 
four methods (self, partner, opponent, and partner's 
opponent). The correlation matrix for these data, as well as 
for correlations with both ingroup and outgroup evaluations, 
may be found in Appendix F. 
A restricted maximum likelihood factor analysis was then 
performed on the multitrait-multimethod matrix, using a pro­
cedure described by Boruch and Wolins (1970). For individual 
trait items which were rated on 7-point scales, 1 ratings 
were scored 0, and 7 ratings, 8, in order to spread out the 
tails of the distributions. 
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The factor analysis was restricted in that if a trait (or 
method) was not used for a particular measure, then the 
factor loading corresponding to that trait (or method) was 
defined to be exactly zero. If the trait (or method) was 
used in the measure, the relevant factor loading was left to 
vary unrestricted. The elements in the general factor were 
also left unrestricted, Osing such a procedure, it is possi­
ble to estimate trait, method, and error variance 
attributable to a particular measure. The factor matrix may 
also be found in Appendix F. 
Of particular interest to the present study were the 
loadings between trait factors and individual trait ratings 
for ingroup and outgroup members. For ratings of self, sig­
nificant loadings were found only for skill (df=132, 
£<.0001), with a near significant loading for socionetric 
(2<,10); for partner, all traits were found to load signifi­
cantly with the particular trait factors (2s<.0001), For 
outgroup members, however, only one significant loading was 
obtained - for the motive trait (£<.0001), 
The group evaluation loadings across the factor matrix 
for individual evaluations furnishes some insight into the 
composition of the group evaluation data. For ingroup evalu­
ations across methods, significant loadings were found for 
self, partner, and opponent (£s<.05). Similar findings were 
obtained for outgroup evaluations. In neither case was a 
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significant loading obtained for ratings of partner's 
opponent. Loadings for ingroup evaluations across traits 
were found to be significant only for sociometric and person­
ality dimensions £s<.05). For outgroup evaluations, loadings 
were significant for sociometric, personality, and skill di­
mensions (£S<.05). 
Correlational evidence: Group evaluations and group 
reward allocations. Own group bias was found to correlate 
positively with percent reward allocation to the ingroup, 
r(142)=.52, 2<.0001. The bias scores also were positively 
related to amount of money allocated to self, r=.46, £<.0001, 
and to partner, r=.44, £<.0001; but negatively with amount 
allocated to opponent and partner's opponent, rs=, respec­
tively, -.49, -.47, £s<.0001. Perceived ingroup success was 
significantly correlated with percent ingroup reward alloca­
tion, r=.24, £<.01, and own group bias was positively related 
to perceived ingroup success, r=.24, £<.01. 
Correlational evidence; Perceived individual inputs and 
allocations to individuals. Estimated percent of total 
points scored was correlated highly for the relationship be­
tween own performance and self-allocations, r=.53, £<.0001, 
The relationship between perceived partner performance and 
partner allocation was less strong, r=.23, £<.005, and the 
relationship for opponent was r=.43, p<.00i. Finally, the 
relationship for partner's opponent was nonsignificant. 
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r=.10, £=n.s. It must be recalled, however, that the esti­
mated percent scoring data were not independent estimators 
across rated participants. 
Liking and group evaluations. Individual ANOT&s were 
performed on the perceived liking data (see Appendix C) for 
partner, opponent, and partner's opponent, yielding no sig­
nificant effects of any relevance. In fact the only signifi­
cant effect across all three analyses was an interaction be­
tween group outcome and individual inputs for the "like 
partner" data, F (2,132)=4.34, £<.05. The most significant 
correlation between either ingroup evaluations, outgroup 
evaluations, and own group bias, and liking for either 
partner, opponent, or partner's opponent was c^142)=.07, 
£=n.s. These findings seem to indicate that group evalua­
tions and liking for individual group members are assessing 
two rather independent dimensions of the social exchange re­
lationship. It is perhaps significant that liking for 
partner and liking for opponent and partner*s opponent were 
highly correlated, rs= respectively, .51 and .47, £s<.0001, 
and that liking for opponent and liking for partner's 
opponent were also highly correlated, r=.60, £<.0001. 
Perceived fairness. Individual ANOVAs were also 
performed on the measures of perceived fairness of reward al­
locations to each of the experimental participants (see Ap­
pendix C). For allocation fairness to self, there were no 
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significant differential effects across conditions, and the 
mean fairness rating was 5.95 on a 7-point scale (with 7 
being most fair). This finding indicates that subjects be­
lieved they had allocated a relatively fair share of the 
total reward to themselves across all conditions. The mean 
rating of fairness for partner was 5.86, and the analysis 
revealed that subjects in the $3 expectation condition 
perceived the partner allocation to be more fair than in the 
$12 expectation condition, £(1,132)=6.52, £<.01, 
Incidentally, in the former condition, partner received 
$1,60, and in the latter, $1.62. Perceived fairness by 
opponent revealed significant effects for individual inputs, 
P(2,132)=5.24, £<.01 (low>equal=high, £<.05, Newman-Keuls). 
The mean fairness rating for opponent was 5.40. Finally, 
perceived fairness by partner's opponent yielded a signifi­
cant effect only for individual inputs, F(2,132) =4.62, £<,05 
(low>egual=high, £s<,05, Newman-Keuls), and the average 
fairness rating was 5,41, 
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Discussion 
The crucial issue underlying much of the present inves­
tigation is ascertaining the significant variables affecting 
what is considered unfair, inequitable, or unjust by one or 
more participants of an exchange. Several theories have been 
developed to account for such behavior (e.g., Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959; Sherif, 1958; Tajfel, 1969; Adams, 1965; Blau, 
1964; Pettigrew, 1967). These theories agree that both 
personal reward-cost considerations are important, and that 
comparitive processes are involved. Individuals are assumed 
to compute their ratios of outcomes to inputs, and then to 
compare this ratio to some comparison standard. To the 
extent these ratios are unequal, the exchange is perceived as 
unfair, and the individual is dissatisfied with the exchange. 
Stouffer, et al. (1949) expressed the point succinctly when 
they suggested that deprivation is relative - inequity can be 
derived only through a process of comparison through which 
certain outcomes are specified as being more or less 
gratifying than others. The primary points of dissension 
among these various theories, in terms of the present study, 
surround the determination of the standard of comparison an 
individual employs under varying circumstances. 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Weick (1966), Lane and Hesse 
(1972), and other writers suggest than an individual derives 
and maintains an internal standard which supplies him with 
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expectations for appropriate relationships between rewards 
and costs in social exchanges, Blaa (196%), Homans (1961), 
and Adams (1965), on the other hand, suggest an individual 
determines the fairness of an exchange by comparing his 
inputs and outcomes to those of a similar comparison Other. 
And finally, Herton (1957), Sherif (1958), Pettigrew (1967), 
and Tajfel (1969) suggest that normative expectations derived 
from group membership could affect the nature of an individu­
al's exchange behavior. 
The present study suggests that perceived fairness in an 
exchange relationship is multidetermined - a joint function 
of the intraindividual, the interpersonal, and the intergroup 
situation. Any or all of these factors may be relevant for 
the occurrence of fair or unfair exchanges, depending upon 
their particular circumstances. One may use an internal 
standard of comparison when salient inputs and outcomes are 
clearly defined; one may compare with another, perhaps simi­
lar, person when the salience of particular inputs or 
outcomes is ambiguous or when such information is 
unavailable; or one may behave according to a group standard 
of comparison when group reference or membership functions 
are particularly salient. In fact, Austin and Susmilch (in 
press) have suggested there is no a priori basis for assuming 
one source of comparison to be more important than any other, 
or that the different processes are competing. They suggest 
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several types of comparison are important, and that the vari­
ous determinants of comparison are additive. Although the 
present study gives little support for an additive model of 
exchange evaluation, it does provide support for the 
multidetermination of such evaluations. 
In the present experimental setting, a group standard of 
comparison seems to have been operative across all treatment 
conditions. Even though ingroup members allocated large 
rewards to the ingroup, thus exploiting outgroup members, the 
larger portion of the ingroup allocation was given to 
partner, and not to self. These findings support the 
contention of Tajfel (1969) that group membership furnishes 
individual members with a generic discriminatory norm for 
outgroup members, but an altruistic norm for ingroup members. 
The mere fact that ingroup and outgroup were differentiated 
within a competitive group setting seems to have introduced 
the tendency for ingroup members to make inequitable reward 
allocations to outgroup members, as well as to derogate their 
performances on the experimental task, and even their 
personal characteristics. 
Relative individual inputs also exerted selective 
effects on reward allocations. Although reward allocations 
within groups tended to be equal, implying that individual 
inputs were largely ignored or unimportant, the deviations 
from equality which did occur were in the direction predicted 
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by equity theory. However, in this situation, membership 
group considerations seen to have overridden the effects of 
relative individual contributions for the sake of intragroup 
harmony and stability. 
The internal standard of comparison for rewards in this 
situation seems to have exerted only minimal effects on 
reward allocations. However, it is significant that for 
losing groups, where group-derived reinforcements would have 
been relatively small, and where group cohesiveness was low, 
individuals who in fact expected more reward than they were 
entitled to on the basis of their task inputs allocated more 
of the total reward to themselves than did subjects who were 
overrewarded. Thus, it appears that conditions which reduce 
the salience of the interpersonal or intergroup relationship 
function to increase the salience in the internal reward 
standard. 
Effects of group membership 
It has been suggested by several studies of intergroup 
relations (i.e., Dion, 1973a; Tajfel, 1970) and shown by Ryen 
and Kahn (in press) that group membership produces not only a 
cognitive differentiation between ingroup and outgroup, but 
that this differentiation on the basis of group membership 
has significant consequences for how group members behave 
toward other ingroup and outgroup memberso In fact, studies 
by sherif, et al. (1961) and Tajfel (1970) have found that 
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ingroup members tend to be cooperative and even altruistic 
toward other ingroup members, but often derogate and discrim­
inate against outgroup members, Tajfel goes so far as to 
suggest that during the process of socialization we acguire 
generic norms for outgroup discrimination. According to 
Tajfel, the fact that we learn rather early to differentiate 
between "we" and "they" has significant implications for not 
only the ways we perceive and think about intergroup rela­
tions, but also the quality of social interaction between 
members of various groups. 
The present study provides support for the selective 
cognitive and behavioral consequences of group membership for 
both intragroup and intergroup relations. Specifically, 
ingroup members not only evaluated the ingroup, ingroup mem­
bers, and ingroup performance more positively than outgroups, 
outgroup members, and outgroup performance, but they also 
tended to allocate greater portions of a jointly earned 
reward to the ingroup members than they would have been 
entitled to on the basis of their relative contributions to 
the joint outcome (equity theory, Adams, 1965). Although 
equity theory would predict that, since winning groups had 
higher inputs than losing groups, they should allocate more 
outcomes to themselves than losing groups, the distribution 
of the joint outcome should have been in proportion to those 
relative inputs. However, winning groups, as well as losing 
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groups, allocated significantly larger proportions to the 
ingroup. This behavioral exploitation of outgroup in favor 
of ingroup was highly correlated with the relative evaluative 
preference for the ingroup. These findings may be taken as 
supportive of the proposition that group membership furnishes 
the individual with a very potent source of normative expec­
tation with respect to intergroup relations, which influences 
not only his perceptions and attributions concerning ingroup 
and outgroup characteristics, but which also affects pre­
scriptions of appropriate behavior toward ingroup and 
outgroup members. 
In fact, it may even be asserted that group membership 
affects the subjective process of determining what constitute 
appropriate relationships between rewards and costs in social 
exchanges. Although ingroup members made significant devia­
tions from eguity in reward allocations, subjects reported 
they neither felt such reward allocations were unfair, nor 
that such allocations would be perceived as unfair, even by 
exploited outgroup members. On the measures of perceived 
fairness of the reward allocations attributed to the various 
experimental participants, ratings in all conditions were 
toward the positive pole of perceived fairness. To the 
extent that these findings are reliable and do not represent 
artifacts due to self-justification for the distribution of 
rewards, this finding suggests that despite the fact that 
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group members introduced inequity into the social exchange, 
they did not believe their actions to be unjust. 
The fact that such findings were obtained under such 
minimal conditions of intra- and intergroup interaction in 
which subjects never had even visual contact with one anoth­
er, nor were their task performances actually interdependent 
in any way, attests to the potential potency of group refer­
ence and membership on both individual and group behavior in 
intergroup settings. Although intergroup hostility and 
antagonism are well documented in more naturalistic settings 
(Sheriff et al-, 1961; Harding, et al., 1969; Allport, 1954), 
it appears that behavioral differentiation or discrimination 
based on group membership may be a frequent consequence of 
group categorization processes (see Dion, 1973a; Kelvin, 
1970) which may be produced in relatively minimal social sit­
uations (Babbie S Wilkens, 1971; Kahn 6 Ryen, 1972; Ryen & 
Kahn, in press). Thus, it might be suggested that such 
perennial social problems as stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination reflect basic social information processing 
schemes inherent in our perceptual-cognitive apparatus. 
Sherif (1958) has suggested that the basic necessary 
component of intergroup conflict is reciprocal frustration in 
terms of outcomes: since there is a fixed amount of reward 
available, the sore one group receives, the less the other 
receives. In the present study, although the task orienta-
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tion between groups was competitive, group reward structures 
were not reciprocally frustrating (see Deutsch, 1949). Since 
reward allocations were determined by the subject, and not by 
the constraints of the experimental task, it would have been 
possible for all subjects to receive equitable outcomes. The 
fact that reward allocations were inequitable under these 
conditions suggests that incompatible behavioral orientations 
between groups, rather than reciprocal reward frustration be­
tween groups (i.e., realistic group conflict, LeVine & 
Campbell, 1972) are more crucial factors influencing the 
occurrence of intergroup antagonism. 
Effects of individual inputs 
although the prediction can be derived from equity 
theory that reward allocations both within and between 
ingroups and outgroups should be proportional to the relative 
task inputs of the individual group members, significant de­
viations from this prediction were obtained. The direction 
of these deviations gives support to several of the experi­
mental hypotheses. Although individual inputs did have sig­
nificant effects on reward allocations (in addition to the 
effects discussed above for group membership per se) , the 
primary locus of effect was on allocations between groups, 
with only minimal effects on allocations within groups. High 
input subjects allocated more of the joint reward to the 
ingroup than did equal input subjects, who in turn took 
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greater shares for the ingroup than did low input subjects. 
However, equity theory predicts input effects on individual 
allocations, not on allocations to groups, and the findings 
for individual allocations within groups do not support 
equity predictions. In fact, within group allocations were 
almost unaffected by relative member inputs. The process by 
which individual inputs affect how individuals allocate 
rewards between groups, while exerting only minimal effects 
on within group allocations is unclear. Inspection of the 
relationship between relative group evaluations and alloca­
tions between groups is suggestive. Group evaluations and 
group reward allocations were highly correlated, suggesting 
that individual inputs affect relative group evaluation, 
which affects group reward allocations. Earlier research by 
Kahn and Eyen (1972) and Ryen and Kahn (in press) supports 
this interpretation, and further suggests that the obtained 
group evaluations do not merely reflect subject justifica­
tions for the inequitable reward allocations. 
low input subjects did in fact allocate less money to 
themselves, though only slightly less than an equal portion 
of the ingroup allocation. Equal, as well as high input 
subjects allocated almost identical rewards to their partners 
and themselves, despite the fact that perceived input differ­
ences between ingroup and outgroup members were consistently 
reported, and that such reward allocations underrewarded the 
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individuals making allocations. 
An alternative interpretation of these findings would be 
that despite accurate perception of relative input differ­
ences, subjects found it too difficult or too cumbersome to 
compute the reward-cost ratios for all participants, and 
therefore tended to ignore input differences in making reward 
allocations. Or possibly, the manipulated inputs were not 
the inputs perceived by subjects to be salient to the ex­
change relationship. In fact, several subjects reported 
during the debriefing session that the important input con­
sideration in this instance was merely the fact they had 
participated as a subject, and not their experimental per­
formances. Such interpretations, however, are not parsimoni­
ous, since they would require selective effects over experi­
mental treatments. Of course, since inputs are probably de­
termined to a large extent personally, such interpretations 
may be valid for particular subjects. 
These results suggest that equity motivation in this 
situation may play a secondary role to concerns for ingroup 
solidarity and stability, as has been suggested by Thibaut 
and Kelley (1959) and Leventhal, et al. (1972) . Since low 
input subjects had contributed little to ingroup task suc­
cess, inequitable or even equal reward allocations within 
ingroup might have induced dissatisfaction in the partner. 
Not only would such allocations have produced inequity for 
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the high input partner, but neither would his task efforts 
have been recognized by the lower input (and by implication, 
lower status) subject, which could have threatened the 
harmony of the ingroup. More or less equitable reward allo­
cations might thus signal to the high input partner that his 
contributions had been recognized and appreciated. For the 
high input subjects, though their task contributions had been 
greater than their partner's contributions, equal reward al­
locations functioned possibly to minimize the intragroup 
conflict which less altruistic allocations could have 
induced, as well as to maintain the group which provided him 
status and power. 
There are two possible interpretations of the ingroup 
allocations of the equal input subjects. Because individual 
inputs in that condition were in fact equal, it may be that 
the potential for intragroup conflict was reduced to a suffi­
cient extent that equity considerations were of greater 
salience, resulting in proportional but equal reward alloca­
tions. Such an interpretation gives support for the proposi­
tion by Kahn (1972) that to the extent that social relation­
ships are important, even distinct input differences tend to 
be ignored to avoid status distinctions inherent in such 
judgments. Another possibility for this finding would be 
that equal input subjects did not perceive their relative 
performances to be significantly different from the percep­
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tions of high input subjects. This explanation is unlikely, 
however, since manipulation check items revealed significant 
differences between these conditions in estimated perform­
ances of participants which were in the expected direction. 
Overall, the findings for ingroup reward allocations suggest 
that in ingroup settings, where ingroup stability is impor­
tant or salient, equity for particular individuals within 
that group may become a less potent determinant of reward al­
locations than would be suggested by equity theory. 
The reward allocation data for distributions between 
outgroup members also revealed significant deviations from 
equity predictions. Low input subjects allocated outgroup 
rewards equally, and thus did not differentiate between 
outgroup members on the basis of individual inputs, even 
though they discriminated performance differences between 
those outgroup members with only minor distortions. Equal 
input subjects also allocated outgroup rewards equally as 
predicted, but high input subjects tended to divide outgroup 
rewards more on the basis of relative member inputs. Thus, 
though input differences were perceived between outgroup mem­
bers, only high input (high status) subjects took these dif­
ferences into account in the reward allocations. 
One possible explanation for these findings may be 
derived from closer inspection of the group evaluation data. 
Generally, the findings, particularly for outgroup évalua-
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tions, replicate the findings of previous research, which 
suggests that outgroup evaluations tend to be not only lower 
than ingroup evaluations, but also less variable, across a 
wide variety experimental conditions (i.e.. Sample S Botto, 
1969; Kahn S Byen, 1972). Thus, it appears that outgroup 
evaluations tend to be relatively stereotyped. It is 
notable, however, that in the present study, while low and 
equal input subjects also exhibited this stereotypic pattern 
of outgroup evaluations despite differences in group outcome, 
the variation in outgroup evaluations attributable to indi­
vidual inputs was significantly larger than for the other 
input conditions. Thus, although the exact mechanism for the 
effect is unclear on the basis of the present study, it 
appears that high input (high status) group members are 
either more willing or more able to differentiate between 
outgroup members, both in terms of outgroup evaluations and 
in terms of subsequent behavioral responses to outgroup mem­
bers (i.e., reward allocations). Lower input subjects, on 
the other hand, tended to make outgroup attributions and 
reward allocations more on the basis of their outgroup cate-' 
gory membership, ignoring individual variation in inputs and 
other characteristics. For the equal input subjects, it is 
unclear whether they made allocations on the basis of accu­
rate perceptions of task inputs, or whether their equal allo­
cations reflect the same stereotyping process suggested for 
81 
the low input group members. Although both factors may be 
operative, the fact that equal subjects also exhibited negli­
gible variations in their evaluations of outgroup suggests 
ingroup membership for all but relatively high status group 
members increases the tendency to treat all members of the 
outgroup (outgroup categorization) as equivalent (Kelvin, 
1970). Thibaut and Kelley suggest that because they are more 
dependent on the group for positive outcomes than high status 
members, low status subjects have less freedom to deviate 
from group norms, due to possible loss of their positive 
outcomes. The high status member, on the other hand, is able 
to derive relatively positive outcomes solely on the basis of 
his status, and thus is less dependent upon the group, and 
freer to violate group norms without sacrificing his good 
outcomes. 
If we assume in this situation, that a group norm does 
in fact exist, perhaps similar to Tajfel's (1969) generic 
norm for outgroup orientation, then it is not surprising that 
only the higher status, high input group members 
differentiated between outgroup members in terms of reward 
allocations. 
Effects of group outcome 
Winning in an intergroup competitive situation was found 
to produce larger ingroup reward allocations than losing. 
These findings could be predicted in terms of equity theory. 
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since winning groups would probably have had greater inputs 
than losing groups toward the joint outcome, and thus would 
have been entitled to a larger portion of the joint reward. 
These findings were also much in line with the findings of 
Sheriff et al., (1961) and others (Wilson & Miller, 1961; 
Kahn & Ryen, 1972) that winning elicits more favorable 
ingroup evaluations, whereas losing deters the penchant for 
ingroup favoritism. Not only did winning group members 
display greater own group bias (Kahn S Ryen, 1972) than 
losing group members, but they also allocated larger shares 
of the total reward to the ingroup. Significantly, own group 
bias accounted for a greater proportion of variance in 
predicting ingroup reward allocations than did perceived 
ingroup success ratings, or individual success or evaluative 
ratings. 
Although it was not possible to determine the causal se­
quence between these relationships on the basis of the 
present investigation, the findings were suggestive. 
Extrapolating from past research by Ryen (in preparation; 
Kahn & Ryen, 1972), Kelvin (1970) and Dion, 1973a), one pos­
sibility would be that the normative prescriptions for behav­
ior in particular social relationships (see Tajfel, 1969, 
1970; Deutsch, 1949) affect the processes through which we 
categorize social objects, in this case, ingroups and 
outgroups, which then influences the characteristics we at­
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tribute to members of those social categories, as veil as 
subsequent behavioral responses toward members of the various 
categories. Factors which influence the degree of rigidity, 
or the salience of these categorization processes would thus 
be hypothesized to influence both the perceptual-cognitive 
and the behavioral components of future intergroup relation­
ships. It will be the role of further extensive research in 
this area to establish the validity of such a 
conceptualization. 
The inhibitive effects of losing in a competitive situa­
tion on own group bias was supported by the finding that in­
dividual inputs produced rather dramatic effects on own group 
bias for winning conditions, with the bias increasing as a 
function of individual inputs; but for losing conditions, al­
though the effects were in the predicted direction, the mag­
nitude of effect was much less. In addition, allocations to 
partner's opponent were more equitable by winning group mem­
bers, but were nearly equal for losing group members across 
all input conditions, suggesting that losing fosters 
stereotyped behavior with respect to outgroup members. These 
findings lend additional support to the view that group mem­
bership, as well as membership group outcomes, exerted sig­
nificant influence on subject perceptions and behaviors in 
the present study. 
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One other finding deserves consideration at this point -
the lack of support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted low 
input subjects would allocate the most reward of all to the 
ingroup when it won, and the least when the ingroup lost. 
Instead, the high input subject instead, took the most for 
the ingroup when it won, in opposition to the experimental 
hypothesis. Further, in opposition to the findings of Kahn 
and Ryen (1972), group evaluations followed a similar pattern 
to the obtained group reward allocations. The explanation 
for this replication failure, as well as for several other 
inconsistent findings for group evaluations, such as the sig­
nificant experimental effects on outgroup ratings which in 
past studies have been nearly invariant across subjects, is 
unclear. Although there are procedural differences between 
the present study and previous studies concerned with own 
group bias, the major reason for inconsistency may well be 
the fact that dyadic groups were used in the present study, 
while previous studies have used triadic or larger groups. 
There are numerous studies which suggest that dyadic groups 
are gualitatively different from larger collectivities, in 
communication patterns (Bales 5 Borgatta, 1965), problem 
solving ability, leadership emergence, group cohesiveness 
(Bass, 1960), and group evaluations (Ryen, unpublished data, 
1968) . It is possible that the present dyadic situation pre­
sented the individual with a social relationship which was 
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more interpersonal than intragroup, in which the existence of 
a group entity, distinct from the individuals composing it, 
was unclear. Subjects were thus forced to participate in an 
exchange which was not clearly either individualistic or 
aggregative, and in which the relationship between individual 
and group inputs, and joint outcome was ambiguous. And since 
the existence of the ad hoc laboratory group was neither 
well-defined nor temporally stable, the present experimental 
conditions were not conducive to the development of stable 
group norms which were not already implicit in the individu­
al's structuring of group and intergroup situations. 
Effects of reward expectation 
The failure to find significant effects of individual 
reward expectation (i.e., an internal standard, Heick, 1966; 
Pritchard, 1969; Lane & Messe, 1972) either for absolute 
amount allocated for self, or for percent ingroup reward 
allocated to self when expectancy was violated, suggests that 
group membership may decrease the importance of the internal 
standard. It appears that when one belongs to a group, and 
experiences outcomes in the context of group membership, 
group maintenance and identification become more salient than 
the internal standard introduced into this situation. It is 
significant that in the losing conditions, where own group 
bias was low and where group cohesiveness should also have 
been low (Dion, 1973b; Sherif, et al., 1961), individual ex­
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pectation did affect reward allocations. For these groups, 
individuals who expected much more money than they actually 
received for their joint performance, took greater portions 
for themselves than in other conditions. In the winning con­
dition, if any trend emerges at all, it is in the opposite 
direction, with the larger share of the ingroup reward 
allocated to partner. Again, these findings support the 
thesis that reward evaluations, as well as reward alloca­
tions, may be based on more than one dominant exchange 
motive. The particular factor, or factors, in a situation 
which determine the allocation of rewards, and the perceived 
fairness of reward allocations, are a function of the 
personal and social environment in which the exchange occurs. 
One major goal of future research in the area of fairness-
equity should be to delineate those situational features 
which determine which are operative in what particular condi­
tions. 
Perceived similarity and social comparison 
Again, we return to the question of the determination of 
the comparison standard for determining fairness of reward 
allocations. Adams (1965), as well as Festinger (1954) sug­
gested that in an ambiguous situation such as the present 
one, in which the appropriateness of the relationship between 
inputs and outcomes is relatively ambiguous, individuals 
should compare with individuals who are similar. The present 
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study suggests, instead, that the individual may derive a 
comparison standard from any of several sources which do not 
necessarily imply similarity on any task relevant dimensions. 
For instance, self and partner's opponent were identical in 
terms of a very crucial (for equity theory) dimension -
inputs. Yet, although individual ratings on the skill dimen­
sion were relatively veridical (with skill of ingroup members 
slightly inflated), allocations between self and partner's 
opponent were not proportional to inputs. Despite large in­
dividual input differences, ingroup allocations tended to be 
nearly equal. 
In terras of sociometric and personality characteristics, 
ingroup members judged one another to be very similar, and 
judged outgroup members to be similar, and yet judged ingroup 
and outgroup to be dissimilar. Because subjects had never 
interacted socially and were randomly assigned to conditions, 
this finding is very significant. In addition, individual 
ratings of ingroup members (self and partner) were found to 
load significantly on the same trait factors, but outgroup 
member ratings did not. If these findings may be taken for 
support for the hypothesis that ingroup membership furnishes 
the individual with a basis of social comparison, then it is 
interesting that similarity on several traits along which the 
individual had no objective information, was attributed to 
partner, but not to either member of the outgroup. 
88 
These findings may be taken as support for the group 
categorization hypothesis of Kelvin (1970). If we assume the 
individual categorizes the experimental participants on the 
basis of ingroup/outgroup membership, then it is not 
surprising that different members of the same category would 
be attributed equivalence on traits where objective informa­
tion is unavailable. Of course, since subjects did have some 
information available concerning relative member inputs, and 
significant distortions along this dimension would have been 
difficult to maintain. 
Finally, the study by Wilson, et al., (1965) found evi­
dence for selective motive bias for the outgroup. In other 
words, the motives of other group members were judged to be 
less positive or less socially desirable than those of 
ingroup members, and this trend was more pronounced on motive 
traits than for other measured traits. Some support for this 
finding was obtained in the present analysis, but the 
selective motive bias held only for the individual's direct 
opponent, about who the subject might have perceived himself 
to have more direct contact than with his partner's opponent. 
Wilson, et al., accounted for selective motive bias in terms 
of defensive projection. 
Suggestions for further research 
SêvêEâl ilêàêâiCîi yuêsiluus eiaeuye Ecom the present in­
vestigation. Host generally, the question arises, how do we 
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process social information? Is there qualitatively different 
processes for perceiving and thinking about social informa­
tion, or are there basic mechanisms underlying all informa­
tion processing schemes which differ only in content and com­
plexity? A integrative theory of information processing 
would draw fresh blood not only into social psychology, but 
into psychology in general. 
More practical questions also emerge from the present 
study. For instance, are intergroup prejudice and 
stereotyping a necessary consequence of group categorization 
processes? How might one channel the development of ingroup 
bias into constructive, or at least, not destructive 
channels? It would be interesting to examine the emergence 
and development of the ingroup bias phenomenon across much 
longer temporal spans in more naturalistic settings, and to 
examine the relationships between own group bias and the de­
velopment of group structure, and intergroup conflict. 
Despite the fact that a significant portion of Man's exist­
ence revolves around the groups he belongs or aspires to, it 
seems we are only on the threshold of understanding the rela­
tionship between the person and the group. 
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Table 11. Experimental task instructions. 
The purpose of the present experiment is to study 
game-playing behavior in a competitive intergroup 
situation. We are interested in studying the 
strategies you might employ in this situation in 
attempting to anticipate and outwit the opposing 
group, as well as your ability to discern strategic 
cues from your partner's behavior in the absence of 
verbal contact with him. 
The task you will be working on today is called the 
matrix-game. The rules of the game are relatively 
simple. On any given trial, one member of each 
group chooses between five possible choice alterna­
tives: #1, #2, #3, #4, or #12, Simultaneously, 
the person opposing him from the other group also 
chooses one of these alternatives. These choices 
are made on signal from the experimenter, and these 
signals will be transmitted approximately every 
fifteen seconds, so that there will be four trials 
every minute. 
as you can quickly discern, since there are five 
possible choices for each person, and two individu­
als are making choices on each trial, this yields a 
total of twenty-five possible choice combinations. 
Associated with each different choice combination 
is a specific trial outcome, which may differ for 
each participant. On any single trial, there are a 
total of four possible points to be distributed be­
tween the two players. Thus, it is possible for 
you to receive four, three, two, one, or zero 
points for a trial, while your opponent would re­
ceive, respectively, either zero, one, two, three, 
or four points. The scoring matrix from which the 
matrix-game draws its name is illustrated on the 
sheet in front of you entitled "Matrix-Game Scoring 
Table." On the left side of the matrix are listed 
your five choice options, while across the top are 
listed your opponent's choice options. 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
The combinations of possible choices form a 
five-by-five matrix. The choice combination 
outcomes are listed in each of these cells for that 
particular choice combination: your scoring 
outcome for a trial is listed in the lower left 
portion of the cell diagonal, and the opposition's 
scoring, in the upper right portion. 
The trial choices are made by means of the appara­
tus in front of you, which consists of a series of 
lights and switches. To make a specific choice, 
you simply flip on the switch or switches corre­
sponding to your strategy choice . After a player 
from each group has made a choice, on cue, these 
choices will be relayed to a programming apparatus 
located in the control room, which will analyze the 
two choices, and their relationships to other 
choices, and then relay the respective trial 
outcomes to each group. These trial outcomes may 
be learned by watching the payoff panel located di­
rectly above your choice lights. For zero points, 
no light will flash on, for one point the number 
one light will flash on, for two points, the number 
two light, and so forth. The opposing player will 
simultaneously receive the difference between the 
total of four possible points, and the number of 
points you receive for that trial. 
after one player from each group has completed a 
trial, the remaining person from each group will 
complete a trial seguence in identical fashion. 
Thus, within your group, you will be alternating 
trials with your partner, and each individual on 
one group will always be opposing the same member 
of the other group. Therefore, your primary con­
cern will be attempting to anticipate the playing 
strategy of that other person, in attempting to ac­
cumulate as many points possible for your own 
group, and to yield as few points to the other 
group as possible. Your partner, in turn, will 
have the responsibility of outwitting that individ­
ual from the other group who he is opposing. 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
If you will notice on the table in front of yon, 
each of you has an identification tag, either "X" 
or "Y." Notice also on the right of the choice 
panel, there are two lights, one labeled "X," and 
the other, "Y." These lights will be your signals 
to make your strategy choices. When the "X" light 
comes on, player "X" from each group will have fif­
teen (15) seconds in which to make his choice; when 
the "Y" light comes on, player "Y" will also have 
fifteen seconds in which to make a strategy choice. 
Only one of these lights will be on at a time. 
However, if you do not choose within the allotted 
time limit, your opponent will score the maximum 
number of points and you will receive none. 
Let's try a few practice trials. (At this time 
each individual was given six practice trials to 
familiarize him with the mechanics and the logic of 
the experimental task.) 
In addition to receiving experimental credit for 
your participation, the four of you will be paid a 
sum of money for the quantity and quality of your 
performance. Quality of performance will be based 
on a complex array of criteria, including the logi­
cal consistency of your strategies, your flexibili­
ty in reacting to strategy changes of the other 
group or of your partner, the speed with which you 
can process complex informational contingencies and 
make complex decisions, and your overall ability to 
function under the stress of intergroup 
competition. The money derives from a grant I have 
received to study complex information processing 
schemes, and will hopefully have the effect of 
encouraging you to take the experiment seriously 
and to perform the task honestly and sincerely.I 
would like to emphasize that you actually will re­
ceive money for your performances, and you will be 
allowed to keep the money you receive. 
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YOUR POINTS OTHER POINTS 
Other Group Choice 
1 2 3 4 12 
Figure 6. Matrix game scoring table. 
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Table 12. Sample reward allocation sheet. 
As has been explained previously, one of you has been 
arbitrarily chosen as the Banker for this experimental 
session. For this particular session, you have been as­
signed as the Banker. You need identify yourself by 
group and identification letter (see below). Remember, 
you are dividing real money which you will receive after 
the completion of the experiment. Your responsibility 
as Banker is to divide the joint reward between the four 
experimental participants. You may divide the reward in 
any manner you wish, and your decision will be final. 
For this session, the participants have earned a total 
of: 
1. Amount for RED X 
2. Amount for BLOE Y 
3. Amount for BLUE X 
4. Amount for RED Y 
NOTE: These four values should sum to the total. 
RED 
Banker Identification: Group 
BLUE 
(Circle as appropriate) 
X 
Member 
Y 
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Table 13. Post-task questionnaire. 
Consider your group. Please check the following pairs 
of adjectives on the basis of how you feel your group 
rates as a whole. Remember, do not check a specific 
member, but check how you feel the group rates as a 
whole. 
foolish : : : : : : : sensible 
close : : : : : : : distant 
bad ; ; : : : : : good 
practical : : : : : ; : impractical 
flexible : : : ; ; : : rigid 
orderly : : : : : : : sloppy 
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Table 13 (Continued) 
Consider the other group. Please check the following 
pairs of adjectives on the basis of how you feel the 
other group rates as a whole. Bemeaber, do not check a 
specific member but check how you feel the group rates 
as a whole. 
sloppy : 
sensible 
good 
distant 
rigid 
impractical 
: orderly 
foolish 
bad 
close 
: flexible 
practical 
Table 13 (Continued) 
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lour Identification: 
Please rate yourself according to how you think you 
would be most accurately described on the following di­
mensions. Do not rate yourself according to how you 
think others would rate you, but rather according to the 
way you perceive yourself to be. 
fair : : : : : : unfair 
unfriendly : : : : : : friendly 
dependent ; : : : ; : independent 
capable ; : : : : : incapable 
competitive : : : : : : cooperative 
likable : : : : ; : dislikable 
unstable : : : : : : stable 
skillful : : : ; ; : lucky 
trustworthy : ; : : : : devious 
unpleasant ; : : : ; : pleasant 
responsible : : : : : : irresponsible 
ineffective : ; : : : : effective 
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Table 13 (Continued) 
Please rate your partner according to how you think he 
would be most accurately described on the following di­
mensions. Do not rate your partner according to how you 
think others would rate him, but rather according to the 
way you perceive him to be. 
effective : : : : : : ineffective 
responsible : : : : : : irresponsible 
unpleasant : : : : ; : pleasant 
trustworthy : : : : : : devious 
lucky ; : : ; ; : skillful 
unstable : : ; : : : stable 
likable : : : : ; : dislikable 
competitive : : : : ; : cooperative 
incapable : : : : : : capable 
independent : ; : ; ; ; dependent 
unfriendly : : : : : : friendly 
u n f a i r  : : : : : :  f a i r  
Table 13 (Continued) 
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Please rate your opponent according to how you think he 
would be most accurately described on the following di­
mensions, Do not rate your opponent according to how 
you think others would rate him, but rather according to 
the way you perceive him to be. 
irresponsible : : : : : : responsible 
skillful : : : : : ; lucky 
cooperative : ; : : ; : competitive 
fair : : : : : : unfair 
capable : : : : : ; incapable 
ineffective : : ; : ; : effective 
friendly : ; : : : : unfriendly 
independent : : : : : : dependent 
dis likable : : : : : : likable 
devious : : : : : : trustworthy 
pleasant : : : ; ; : unpleasant 
stable : : : ; ; : unstable 
Ill 
Table 13 (Continued) 
ilitililfSP 
cooperative_:___;___:_;_:__;___conpstiti7e 
dislikable ; : : : : : likable 
devious . : : : : : trustworthy 
incapable___:_:___:_:___:___;___capabie 
friendly . . : : : : un friendly 
stable . : : : : : unstable 
dependent : . , ^ 
—  — — * — — *  «  iggependent
l q c f c y _ ^ . — .  . — .  s k i l l f i i T  
=_=—•—•._.:_«sponsible 
pleasant . : : : unpleasant 
unfair : : : = = . fair 
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Table 13 (Continued) 
How much money did you initially expect to earn among 
all four participants before you began working on the 
task? 
$ 
How successful do you feel your group was in performing 
the task? 
very unsuccessful : : : : : : very successful 
How successful do you feel the other group was in 
performing the task? 
very successful : : : : : : very unsuccessful 
approximately what percent of total points do you think 
was scored by each of the following individuals (the 
values should total to 100%)? 
You % Partner % Opponent % 
Partner's Opponent % 
How fair do you think each person will feel his portion 
of the total reward is? 
very fair»»»»»very unfair 
You? 
Partner? 
Opponent? 
Partner's Opponent? 
How well would you like each of the following individu­
als as a friend? 
very much»»»»»very little 
Partner? 
Opponent? 
Partner's Opponent? 
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Table 14, Mean similarity data across experimental 
conditions. 
SELF PARTNER 
MOT SOC PER SKL HOT SOC PER SKL 
$3 Expectation 
Lose Low 
Lose Equal 
Lose High 
16. 
15. 
17. 
42 
83 
00 
16. 
16. 
16. 
25 
17 
50 
17. 
16. 
16. 
00 
83 
50 
13. 
15. 
15. 
58 
00 
25 
16. 
16. 
14. 
33 
58 
25 
16. 
16. 
13. 
83 
67 
92 
16. 
15. 
13. 
17 
75 
42 
17. 
16. 
14. 
17 
25 
00 
Win Low 
Win Equal 
Win High 
14. 
17. 
17. 
75 
67 
58 
16. 
16. 
18. 
58 
67 
42 
15. 
16. 
17. 
83 
17 
67 
13. 
15. 
18. 
00 
00 
08 
16. 
15. 
14. 
42 
17 
92 
15. 
16. 
15. 
50 
17 
67 
15. 
15. 
13. 
50 
50 
75 
15. 
15. 
15. 
83 
58 
00 
$12 Expectation 
Lose Low 
Lose Equal 
Lose High 
18. 
15. 
18. 
25 
50 
50 
15. 
15. 
18. 
92 
83 
00 
15. 
14. 
17. 
83 
67 
17 
14. 
16. 
17. 
67 
00 
58 
16. 
16. 
16. 
17 
17 
42 
16. 
14. 
15. 
08 
83 
67 
17. 
14. 
16. 
58 
17 
08 
14. 
16. 
13. 
50 
58 
42 
Win Low 
Win Equal 
Win High 
18. 
18. 
17. 
17 
25 
50 
17. 
18. 
17. 
00 
92 
33 
17. 
18. 
16. 
33 
25 
75 
15. 
17. 
16. 
67 
67 
33 
17. 
15. 
17. 
50 
75 
00 
15. 
16. 
15. 
92 
50 
75 
15. 
16. 
16. 
42 
08 
50 
16. 
16. 
16. 
33 
17 
00 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
OPPONENT PARTNER'S OPPONENT 
MOT SOC PER SKL HOT SOC PER SKL 
$3 Expectation 
13.67 14.67 13.83 14.92 15.75 13.08 15.92 13.92 
10.92 13.75 12.50 13.25 16.42 14.58 15.17 15.50 
11.00 13.17 13.42 12.42 14.92 12.67 11.33 12.67 
13.75 13.58 14.67 14.08 14.75 14.25 13.75 13.17 
11.83 13.08 12.50 12.83 14.25 13.17 13.33 13.50 
11.50 13.67 11.58 10.42 14.33 14.75 14.75 15.25 
$12 Expectation 
13.75 13.08 15.33 16.75 14.83 13.83 15.08 14.58 
11.50 13.17 13.00 14.92 15.25 10.83 13.00 13.33 
11.92 13.83 13.50 12.25 16.17 13.33 12,83 15.67 
11.08 13.83 11.83 14.50 15.58 13.00 13.50 11.42 
12.17 15.17 11.50 15.42 15.08 14.25 14.58 14.17 
11.42 13.17 13.58 12.58 16.17 13.83 13.00 13.83 
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Table 15. Correlation matrix for raw similarity data. 
SELF PARTNER 
MOT SOC PER SKL MOT SOC PER SKL 
Hot 1.00 
SOC .40 1.00 
Per .38 .41 1.00 
Ski .38 .56 .44 1.00 
Mot .22 .12 . 21 .03 1.00 
Soc .20 .21 . 15 .01 .41 1.00 
Per .39 .17 . 12 .05 .49 .60 1.00 
Ski .06 .00 .08 .02 .42 .41 .34 o
 
o
 
Hot .01 .07 - . 06 13 .07 .24 .29 .21 
Soc .03 .11 .23 .07 .30 . 17 .12 .14 
Per -.09 -.06 -.07 -. 13 .08 .00 . 15 .06 
Ski -.03 -.07 .00 -. 14 .34 .18 .32 . 16 
Mot .24 .14 .30 . 14 .47 .28 .26 .25 
Soc . 17 .10 . 16 -.03 .09 .25 . 15 .21 
Per .11 .07 .21 .04 .19 .34 .31 .34 
Ski . 15 .22 . 17 .26 . 10 .21 .22 . 17 
Ing .05 .20 . 15 .24 .07 .10 .06 .15 
Ogr -.02 .02 .10 -.08 .11 .09 . 15 -.06 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
OPPONENT PARTNER'S OPPONENT 
HOT SOC PER SKI HOT SOC PEE SKL ING OGH 
Mot 1.00 
Soc .30 1.00 
Per .31 .11 1.00 
Ski .28 .29 .33 1.00 
Hot .24 .20 .03 .20 1.00 
Soc .34 .15 -.06 -. 15 .33 1.00 
Per .20 .13 ,07 .12 .31 .43 1.00 
Ski .19 .06 .04 -.05 .26 .30 CO
 k 
o
 
o
 
Ing -.06 -.01 .02 -.03 
Ogr .11 .17 .25 .42 
.05 -.01 -.16 -.09 1.00 
.04 -.10 -.13 -.07 .28 1.00 
Mot= motive trait 
Soc= sociometric trait 
Per= personality trait 
Skl= skill trait 
Ing= ingroup evaluations 
Ogr= outgroup evaluations 
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Table 16. Factor matrix for multitrait-multimethod data, 
General 
Factor 
Method 
Factors 
Trait 
Factors 
SELF 
PART 
OPPO 
POPP 
SELF PAET OPPO POPP M S P C 
m .32 .40 -.10 
s .23 .60 .16 
P ,2H .56 -.12 
c .09 .74 .46 
m .72 .16 -.44 
s .43 .63 .61 
P .49 .58 .52 
c .09 .35 
u
n
 m
 
m .55 .18 .79 
s .40 .34 -.03 
P .11 .41 -.03 
c .29 .61 -.08 
m .61 .22 -.07 
s .37 .37 .01 
P .25 .93 . 13 
c .31 .46 .10 
lation 
X .03 .19 .47 .23 -. 12 .01 -.18 -.30 . 10 
y .00 .17 .45 .61 -. 10 .06 -.25 -.27 -.42 
Self= ratings of self 
Part= ratings of partner 
Oppo= ratings of opponent 
Popp= ratings of partner's opponent 
M= motive trait 
S= sociometric trait 
P= personality trait 
C= skill trait 
X= ingruop evaluations 
Y= outgroup evaluations 
Note: Factor loadings not included equal 0 by 
definition. 
